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Abstract
This project was designed to develop the Corporate Safety Culture Scale, a unique
measure of corporate safety culture that is supported by a strong theoretical foundation.
Items were developed conceptually, discussed in cognitive interviews, and submitted to
expert review. Survey items were administered to employees of a large public
transportation organization. Principle components analysis reduced the data and
identified an empirical model. The empirical model held two domains identified as: 1)
“Values,” and 2) “Behavior.” Confirmatory factor analysis compared the fit of the
empirical model with that of a modified empirical model, and the hypothesized model,
which held the following three domains: 1) “Behavior,” 2) “Values,” and 3) “Meaning
Systems.” Goodness of fit indices (Chi-Squared, RMSEA, CFI, ECVI) identified the
modified empirical structure as the model with best fit. The similarities between the
hypothesized and modified empirical models suggested that the CSCS carries strong
theoretical support.
The measure’s reliability was tested using Cronbach’s Alpha. The full CSCS and
each identified domain were shown to have strong Alpha values. One-way between
groups analysis of variance, was used to evaluate the relationship between scores on the
full measure and a categorical safety behavior item. Findings suggested that high scorers
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on the CSCS were safer workers than those with lower scores on the measure. A post
hoc analysis using Tukey’s HSD showed that scores on the full CSCS, and the
“Behavior” domain were significantly related to safety behavior. The analysis of
variance and the post hoc results indicated that a relationship exists between the CSCS
and safety behavior. This finding added to the validity of the measure. The CSCS was
shown to be a theoretically supported, valid and reliable measure that can be used to
evaluate corporate safety culture.
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CHAPTER ONE
STUDY OVERVIEW
Purpose
This study was designed to develop and validate the Corporate Safety Culture
Scale (CSCS), a measure of corporate safety culture. In an effort to address diverse
conceptualizations of corporate culture and corporate safety culture, the measure was
built from a theoretical foundation which combined three common conceptual theories of
corporate culture. A theoretical factor structure, composed of three domains (Meaning
systems, Values, and Behavioral Expectations) was compared to an empirical model,
developed through principle components analysis. A one-way between groups analysis
of variance was used to assess construct validity.
Introduction
Workplace Accidents
The significance of workplace accidents was first publically identified in 1970,
after public officials recognized that the rate of occupational accidents increased by 20%
during the 1960’s. With the implementation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
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of 1970, three related organizations were formed: the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC).
Combined, these organizations were used to create, evaluate, and enforce occupational
safety (Workplace Safety Tips, 2010).
With the creation of OSHA, the value of workplace safety was enforced in
companies across the United States. However, it was not until the 1980’s that
organizations operating in high risk industries began to emphasize and self regulate safety
(International Atomic Energy Agency, 1986). Workplace accidents, defined as
unanticipated occurrences that are preceded by unsafe behaviors or conditions
(DiBerardinis, 1999) have significantly impacted organizations operating within the
mining, agriculture, construction and transportation industries. In 2007 alone, these
industries recorded a combined total of 2,768 employee fatalities (U.S. Department of
Labor, 2010). In the transportation sector, safety has garnered particular interest as
greater than 41% of work-place accidents, across all industries, occur during periods of
transportation (U.S. Department of Labor, 2010). The high rate of accidents in
transportation is alarming because it limits productivity, and negatively influences the
physical and psychological health of employees.
Physical Psychological and Financial
The most observable consequences of workplace accidents are often physical. As
a result of unexpected events, employees may suffer from bodily injuries, illnesses or
even death. The U.S. department of labor (2010) reported that in 2008 alone, 5,214
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individuals were killed as a result of workplace accidents. In the same year, state and
local employees experienced workplace injuries and illness at a rate of 6.3 cases per 100
equivalent full-time employees. In the private sector, occupational illnesses and injuries
were recorded at a rate of 3.9 cases per 100 full-time workers (U.S. Department of Labor,
(2009).
In addition to the physical setbacks caused by the occurrence of workplace
accidents, workers have been shown to experience psychological distress. If an employee
perceives the endangerment of their personal safety or the safety of significant others as a
result of a specific event, he/she may experience symptoms of anxiety. These indicators
of anxiety might include: fear, helplessness or horror, recurrent distressing images or
thoughts of the event, intense psychological distress at exposure to cues that remind the
individual of the event, persistent avoidance of feelings or situations that prompt thoughts
of the experience, and persistent symptoms of increased arousal (Mitchell & Everly,
2001). The presence of these symptoms may lead to the psychological diagnosis of
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or Acute Stress Disorder (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000).
Additionally, exposure to traumatic events may also lead employees to experience
the following symptoms nearly everyday: a depressed mood, markedly diminished
interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities, significant weight loss or gain,
insomnia or hyper-somnia, psychomotor agitation or retardation, fatigue or loss of
energy, feelings of worthlessness or inappropriate guilt, diminished ability to think or
concentrate, indecisiveness, and recurrent thoughts of death (Norris, Kaniasty, &
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Thompson, 1997). The occurrence of these symptoms may signify the presence of Major
Depressive Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
It is important to note that damage caused by workplace accidents goes beyond
the psychological and physical setbacks experienced by employees. As a workforce
copes with the aftermath of an accident, a corporation often suffers a financial loss as a
result of reduced productivity. Research shows that psychological difficulties, including
depression (Simon, Ludman, Unutzer, Operskalski, & Bauer, 2008), and stress
(Marciniak, Lage, Landbloom, Dunayevich, & Bowman, 2004) account for significant
productivity costs. Kessler and Frank (1997) reported that affective disorders including
both depression and anxiety account for a total of 25 lost work days each month per 100
workers. This statistical finding is equivalent to an annualized national projection of over
4 million work lost days. The damaging effect of work place accidents on productivity is
clearly shown within the transportation industry. As a result of illness or injury, the
United States department of labor documented an incidence rate of 2.5 days away from
work per every 100 transportation employees in 2008. The incident rate increased to 3.9
when the department of labor included cases with job transfers and job restrictions (U.S.
Department of Labor, 2009).
Origin of Accidents	
  
In the aftermath of a workplace accident, investigators focus on identifying
culpability for the unplanned incidents. Avoidable occupational incidents are typically
the result of human error. The unsafe blunders may be systemic or personal. (Reason,
2000). Personal errors refer to individual acts of danger or procedural violations. Often
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personal errors are the result of distraction, lack of interest, sloppiness, negligence,
thoughtlessness, haste, and recklessness. Workplace accidents resulting from purely
personal errors often allow for uncomplicated responses. Because the liable individual is
the sole cause of the accident, the organization of the company does not have to change.
However, many argue that workplace accidents are typically caused by both personal and
systemic errors.
Systemic errors describe organizational processes that allow for accidents to
occur. For example, the 1998 explosion at the Esso natural gas plant was thought to be
caused by systemic problems. The gas plant suffered a two-day fire after a lean oil pump
failed, causing a fracture in the exchanger. In this event, no individual employee directly
caused the blowout. However, the mechanical failure was the result of poor plant design,
training, supervision, management, communication and reporting (Boult & Pitblado,
2001). A similar systemic problem is hypothesized to be responsible BP’s Deepwater
Horizon well explosion. Here, the off shore rig exploded due to a burnout caused by
uncontained natural gas. The explosion led to 11 employee deaths and a record-setting oil
leak in the Gulf of Mexico (Kerr, Kintisch, & Stokstad, 2010). When evaluating the
catastrophe, investigators point to problems with maintenance and operations (Witze,
2010).
When describing safeguards against workplace accidents, Reason, (1990) noted
that all safety measures contain flaws. Although each measure is expected to fully
prevent accidents, alone they are incomplete. The author explained that the protective
features are imperfect because active failures and latent conditions exist. Active failures
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reference the personal mistakes that exist within any organization. They may occur in the
form of procedural violations, slips, misjudgments, and drops. These mistakes can lead
to catastrophic accidents. Reason cites the Chernobyl calamity, prior to which employees
violated procedures by disabling safety systems. As a result, the plant explosion was not
prevented. As was previously mentioned, workplace accidents are rarely caused by
personal errors alone. Reason notes that latent conditions, defined as structural
circumstances that allow for mishaps to occur, are inevitably involved in workplace
accidents. The researcher explained that these conditions may present as
“error provoking conditions within the local workplace (time pressure,
understaffing, inadequate equipment, fatigue, and inexperience) and they
can create long lasting holes or weaknesses in the defenses (untrustworthy
alarms and indicators, unworkable procedures, design and construction
deficiencies, etc)” (Reason, 2000).
When left unresolved, latent conditions can exist enduringly prior to an unwanted
incident. The conditions lie undeveloped until they are triggered by active failures. In an
effort to describe an effective error management approach, Reason referenced the
structure of Swiss cheese. Alone, a single slice of Swiss cheese has many visible holes.
Like Swiss cheese, protective efforts have holes, through which errors can occur. When
isolated, a single protective measure is not sufficient to avoid workplace accidents, too
many holes exist. However, most organizations have many protective barriers. Like
layers of Swiss cheese, when these defenses are held together, the gaps become filled.
For this reason, the author explained that a single latent condition or active failure does
not typically result in an accident. The supporting barriers protect against an unwanted
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incident. When accidents occur, they are created in the rare moments that an active
failure exposes a single hole through each of the defensive layers (Reason, 2000).
Corporate Safety Culture	
  
The combined set of a corporation’s safety-related attitudes, shared meanings,
behaviors, practices, and beliefs, can be labeled the corporation’s safety culture. Safety
culture is important as it reduces the prevalence of what Reason (2000) called active
failures and latent conditions. When safety becomes a priority over productivity,
companies with strong safety cultures are believed to be the most protected and safe
organizations. Approximately 25 years ago, the concept of corporate culture became
significant to investigators working in safety management, because it was believed to be
a significant moderator of employee behavior. This focus on culture as a predictor of
corporate safety was prompted, in large part, by the 1986 nuclear catastrophe at
Chernobyl. After this tragic accident, and several other significant work-place calamities
involving chemical plants, commuter boats, oil tankers, freight trains and commercial
aircraft, investigators observed that commonalities existed in the conditions surrounding
each accident. Hopfl (1994) explained that “despite the obvious differences in the
industries involved and their technologies,….at a contextual level, there [were] many
common characteristics (Reason, 1990, as cited in Hopfl, 1994). As researchers
identified circumstantial similarities, they began to emphasize social and organizational
factors in their evaluations of work place accidents (Hopfl, 1994). This amended focus
was shown in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) updated safety report on
the accident at Chernobyl. The IAEA report explained that “the accident … flowed from
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a deficient safety culture, not only at the Chernobyl plant, but throughout the Soviet
design, operating and regulatory organizations for nuclear power that existed at that time”
(International Safety Advisory Group, 1991).
The impact of corporate culture was also revealed after the 2003 Challenger
Space Shuttle disaster. This tragedy was caused by a combination of latent conditions
that, though foreseeable, were not corrected prior to the shuttle launch. In 2003, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had a history of success. The
organization had not experienced an in-flight accident in the 17 years prior the 2003
tragedy. Though engineers were aware of structural problems, the glitches were ignored
and considered acceptable risks for the Challenger exploration (National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, 2003). NASA had a culture focused more on success than safety.
As a consequence, when the Challenger space shuttle reentered the earth’s atmosphere, a
crack in the thermal protection system led to a major catastrophe (National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, 2003).
Given the influence of corporate culture on safety, it is no surprise that
investigators have started evaluating the culture at BP (previously known as British
Petroleum) in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon blowout and gas explosion. As a
result of the accident, eleven BP employees are presumed dead, and over 1 billion gallons
of oil have leaked into the Gulf of Mexico. This is not the only accident associated with
BP. In 2005, a BP refinery located in Texas exploded, killing 15 employees and injuring
180 additional people. The company was also associated with the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil
spill in Alaska. BP held a controlling interest in the Alaskan oil consortium, which was
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largely responsible for the cleanup effort, and heavily criticized for errors. In reference to
BP’s accident record, Rep. Joe Barton stated that BP has created a “corporate culture of
seeming indifference to safety and environmental issues” (Mauer, 2010).
Statement of the Problem
Following the IAEA report, research on corporate safety culture proliferated. As
a result of the hypothesized predictive power of corporate culture, managers, consultants,
engineers, psychologists and industrialists, all working with different theoretical
backgrounds, were interested in the far reaching impact of the construct. Although this
common interest increased the relevance and study of corporate culture, it did not allow
for the development of a systematic examination of the construct. These early
investigators agreed on the influence of culture but were unable to unanimously support a
single conceptualization or definition. Due to the diverse occupational and theoretical
circumstances, the literature on culture became disorganized, lacking in consistent theory.
Today, the research remains chaotic as investigators continue to debate interpretations of
corporate culture (Pidgeon, 1998).
Justification of the Study
Literature consistently demonstrates a relationship between corporate culture and
organizational growth and performance (Deshpande, Farley, & Webster, 1993; Miron,
Erez, & Naheh, 2004; Ogbonna & Harris, 2000; Prather, & Turrell, 2002). However, the
various theoretical positions of different investigators limit the interpretability of these
findings. It becomes challenging to comprehend the results of any given assessment of
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corporate culture because every measure takes a different perspective. Moreover,
common quantitative measures of corporate culture deviate from the construct of culture
and unintentionally assesses corporate climate.
The creation of a single measurement tool that is built on a solid theoretical
foundation, and pointedly assesses corporate culture would be extremely valuable. The
corporate executive could then use the measure to gain a comprehensive understanding of
the state of his/her company’s culture. This would be especially be important in the
measurement of safety culture, as the repercussions of a poor safety culture can be dire
(Hopfl, 1994; Reason, 1990).
By unifying the research into a single, comprehensive measure, this study will
enable executives to predict and avoid company disasters. As opposed to identifying
culture problems after the occurrence of large-scale accidents, as has been shown in the
case of BP and Compania Minera San Esteban, companies will have the ability to
identify problems in safety culture prior to accidents. The use of a valid and reliable
comprehensive measure of safety culture could save the lives of employees and increase
productivity.
Research Questions
1) Will the hypothesized three factor structure used to select items for the Corporate
Safety Culture Scale fit the data better or worse than the empirically derived
factor structure, and the modified empirical factor structure?
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i. Utilize exploratory factor analysis to derive the empirical factor
structure.
ii. Use confirmatory factor analysis to develop the experimental
model.
iii. Use confirmatory factor analysis to build the empirical factor
model.
iv. Improve the fit of the empirical factor structure by consulting
theory and the modification indices produced by confirmatory
factor analysis. Then use confirmatory factor analysis to build the
modified empirical factor structure.
v.

Compare the model fit of the empirical, modified empirical, and
experimental structures.

2) Will the developed Corporate Safety Culture Scale be a reliable measure of
corporate safety culture?
a. Evaluate the Cronbach’s Alpha values of the full measure and each
identified domain.
3) Will the developed Corporate Safety Culture Scale be a valid measure of
corporate safety culture?
a. Evaluate frequency of safe behaviors by assessing the responses to the
following question: “I received a performance documentation form for
using good safety practices during the past 12 months.”
i. Question has three answer choices: “Yes,” “No,” and “Not Sure.”
11	
  
	
  

b. Use one-way between group analysis of variance to evaluate the
relationship between answers to the behavioral frequency question and
scores on the CSCS.
c. Complete a post hoc analysis using Tukey’s HSD to assess the
relationship between safety behavior and scores on the full CSCS and each
identified domain.
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Definition of Major Concepts

Workplace accidents: Defined as unanticipated occurrences that are preceded by unsafe
behaviors or conditions (DiBerardinis 1999).
Corporate Culture: “The product of individual and group values, attributes, perceptions,
competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style
and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety management” (Lee, 1996).
Corporate Climate: “A set of characteristics that describe an organization and that (a)
distinguish the organization from other organizations, (b) are relatively enduring over
time, and (c) influence the behavior of people in the organization” (Forehand & Gilmer,
1964).
Meaning Systems: Underlying mental constructions that allow for the interpretation and
understanding of how daily events fall into an individual’s personal narrative.
Values: The fundamental moral expectations that an individual uses to appraise daily
events.
Behavioral Expectations: The activities that are anticipated as part of an individual’s
employment responsibilities.
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Summary
This chapter introduced the problems associated with workplace accidents. It
discussed the physical, psychological and financial setbacks that can be created by
critical incidents in the workplace. Corporate safety culture was identified as a critical
component of safety and accident prevention in corporate environments. The chapter
explained that current corporate culture literature is unorganized and lacking in consistent
theory. It noted that current measurement tools are dissimilar and do not adequately
measure corporate safety culture. The importance of a new measurement tool was
discussed. The chapter concluded by delineating the research questions of the current
project.
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CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In common managerial argot, the terms culture and climate are often misused and
misinterpreted. Executives frequently refer to culture in reference to an organization’s
environment, mood, or feel, yet these organizational factors are more closely related to
climate than culture. Organizational culture references an underlying quality that impacts
productivity, structure, strategy and climate within an organization. Despite its recent
surge in popularity, culture is an illusive construct that is rarely considered. For example,
many managers in high risk industries hope to enhance the safety of their organizations.
They proactively work to modify their facilities, guidelines, mission statements and
reward programs. However, very few consider how cultural assumptions about
individual success, responsibility, and masculinity may be thwarting their efforts toward
a safer work environment (Schein, 2000). It is clear that defining culture and climate,
and understanding the difference between the two concepts is critical to any evaluation of
corporate culture. The following section discusses the etiology and definition of each
construct.
Corporate Culture and Corporate Climate
Climate
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The notion of corporate climate was first identified in the 1950’s and 1960’s as
school researchers considered the psychological effects of diverse educational settings
(Hoy, 1990). They were particularly interested in uncovering the educational benefits of
different teaching environments, and worked to define and measure different aspects of
educational atmospheres (Halpin & Croft, 1963). This initial interest in environments was
appreciated by investigators working in large businesses, that believed climate could
explain the long-term characteristics of any work environment (Hoy, 1990). In 1964,
Forehand and Gilmer defined corporate climate as “a set of characteristics that describe
an organization and that (a) distinguish the organization from other organizations, (b) are
relatively enduring over time, and (c) influence the behavior of people in the
organization.” Similarly, Taguiri (1968) drew a connection between personality traits
and an organization’s climate. The author explained that “a particular configuration of
enduring characteristics of the ecology, milieu, social system and culture would
constitute a climate, as much as a particular configuration of personal characteristics
constitute a personality” (Taguiri 1968 p. 23, as cited in Hoy, 1990).
Culture vs. Climate	
  
Research on corporate climate proliferated because it was understood to be a
critical construct that could influence employee behavior (James & Jones, 1974). As the
concept matured through research, investigators began to identify a distinction between
the characteristics, behaviors and feelings that are universally supported by an
organization’s workforce, and the values and beliefs held by most of an organization’s
employees (Ekvall, 1983). This recognition of difference led to the identification of
16	
  
	
  

corporate culture as opposed to corporate climate. Globally, corporate climate refers to
the overt characteristics of an organization’s environment, while corporate culture
references the underlying values and beliefs of a given organization (Guldenmund, 2000).
It is clear that the constructs of corporate culture and corporate climate are not mutually
exclusive. In fact, they are inter-connected, influencing one another as a company grows
and works through challenges (Schien, 2004).
Culture	
  
With the identification of culture as an important construct, corporate leaders,
researchers, managers, and the general public began to develop an interest in the
possibility of creating an organizational culture that influenced employees to behave in a
desired manner. This fascination with culture was fueled by the publication of Theory Z:
How American Business Can Meet the Japanese Challenge (Ouchi, 1981). This wellreceived management work suggested that American corporations could increase
productivity by adopting Japanese management practices. Specifically, the author
referred to an organizational shift that would carry a more collectivistic culture,
characterized by long-term job security, responsibility, group work, and cautious
promotion and evaluation practices (Ouchi, 1981).
Similarly, Peters and Waterman’s work, In Search of Excellence: Lessons from
American’s best run companies (1982) became a seminal management book that
discussed business from a more flexible perspective. As opposed to focusing on
productivity alone, the authors suggested that managers reduce bureaucratic control,
focus on customers, facilitate entrepreneurship, value low-paid employees, centralize
17	
  
	
  

company values and maintain a committed management team (Peters & Waterman,
1982).
As the construct of corporate culture entered the awareness of the general
population, research on the topic proliferated. Investigators with different occupational
and theoretical backgrounds began exploring the impact of culture, finding that positive
cultures correlate with positive financial outcomes (Denison, 1990; Kotter & Heskett,
1992). Although researchers agreed on the value of culture, their fundamental theoretical
differences led to variant definitions of the construct. As a result, the burgeoning
research continued to expand without a solid theoretical foundation. Today, the literature
remains theoretically disorganized (Pidgeon, 1998; Schien, 2004). In an effort to
describe the unsystematic mass of literature, several investigators have created large, allinclusive, models of corporate culture. In the following section models created by
Keesing, Allaire and Firsirotu, and Schein are described.
Theoretical Perspectives of Corporate Culture
Keesing
Keesing (1974) showed that conceptualizations can be placed in two broad
categories, those that perceive culture as a component of a social system, sociocultural,
and those that view culture as a more independent, ideational, construct. The author
indicated that the ideational theories posit that culture is created in the minds of
employees. Conversely, Keesing noted that the sociocultural theories suggest culture is
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generated in the environment, through interpersonal behaviors and corporate
circumstances (Keesing, 1974 as cited in Allaire & Firsirotu, 1984).
	
  
Allaire & Firsirotu	
  
Allaire & Firsirotu (1984) also provided a detailed explanation of culture, which
worked to combine and explain previous conceptualizations. The authors noted that
organizational culture is composed of three interconnected components: the sociocultural
system, the cultural system, and the individual actors. Allaire and Firsirotu explained
that the sociocultural system refers to the official structures and policies of a work
environment. They provided examples of a corporation’s goals, job hierarchy and
management procedures. The cultural system was described as an organization’s
“expressive and affective dimension in a system of shared meaningful symbols
manifested in myths, ideology and values” (Allaire & Firsirotu, 1984). They noted that
the cultural system is influenced by the environment in which an organization exists (e.g.
history, society, economy). The individual actors category refers to the employees of an
organization, who actively interpret and influence the culture. Allaire and Firsirotu noted
that employees are particularly significant because their interpretations of events lead to
the development of culture. Allaire and Firsirotu went further to explain that each of the
categorizations of culture interact and influence one another (Allaire & Firsirotu, 1984).
Schein 	
  
Schein, (2004) also worked to condense the literature by describing culture in
three interacting levels. The first level, Artifacts refers to the observable characteristics
19	
  
	
  

of an organization. This includes the language used, the facilities, the dress code, and any
other tangible quality that can be quickly observed. The second level, espoused beliefs
and values, describes shared ideas of people working within the organization. As a
company grows and overcomes challenges, its employees learn from the growth and
develop long lasting values and beliefs. The third level, labeled underlying assumptions,
refers to core assumptions that are universally supported within a corporation. Schein
explained that these assumptions are supported so often that employees are unable to
consider a different thinking pattern (Schein, 2004).
The models presented by Keesing, Allaire and Firsirotu, and Schein are important
in understanding the challenge of describing corporate culture. Each author struggled to
provide an all-inclusive explanation of culture, while simultaneously providing specific
details that maintain the integrity of the construct. The difficulty inherent in describing
corporate culture lies in the need to honor the breadth of the topic while upholding a level
of specificity that maintains the construct’s significance (Coffey, 2010). Definitions that
are too broad run the risk of missing the particular characteristics of culture.
Examinations that are too narrow miss the larger picture. Many researchers have
attempted to produce an accurate explanation of corporate culture. However, it is clear
that limitations can be found in each proposed definition. For a review of recent
definitions of corporate culture please see Table 1.
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Table 1

Definitions of Corporate Culture

Definition
‘the totality of the learned and shared patterns of
belief and behavior of a human group.’
‘learned behavior copied from one another.’
‘the way we do things around here.’
‘means that total body of tradition borne by a
society and transmitted from generation to
generation. It thus refers to the norms, values and
standards by which the people act, and it includes
the way distinctive in each society of ordering the
world and making it intelligible.
‘the patterned behavior and mental constructs that
individuals learn, are taught, and share within the
context of the group to which they belong.’
‘a set of shared ideals, values, and standards of
behavior; it is the common denominator that makes
the actions of individuals intelligible to the group.’
‘in its most basic form is an understanding of “the
way we do things around here.” Culture is the
powerful yet ill-defined conceptual thinking within
the organization that expresses organizational
values, ideals, attitudes and beliefs.’
‘consists of “learned systems of meaning,
communicated by means of natural language and
other symbol systems, having representational,
directive, and affective functions, and capable of
creating cultural entities and particular senses of
reality.”’
‘the learned patterns of behavior and thought
characteristic of a societal group.’
‘We will restrict the term culture to an ideational
system. Cultures in this sense comprise systems of
shared ideas, systems of concepts and rules and
meanings that underlie and are expressed in the
ways that humans live. Culture, so defined, refers to
what humans learn, not what they do and make.’
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Author(s)
(Aceves & King, 1978)
(Steadman, 1982)
(Deal & Kennedy, 1982)
(Murphy, 1986)

(Whitten, & Hunter, 1987)
(Haviland, 1993)
(Cunningham & Greso, 1994)

(D’Andrade, 1996)

(Harris, 2004)
(Kessing & Strathern, 1998)

‘the set of learned behaviors, beliefs, attitudes,
values, and ideals that are characteristic of a
particular society or population.’
‘All aspects of human adaptation, including
technology, traditions, language, and social roles.
Culture is learned and transmitted from one
generation to the next by nonbiological means.’

(Ember & Ember, 2001)
(Jurmain et al., 2000)

(As described in Coffey, 2006)

When reviewing the different conceptualizations of corporate culture, it is clear
that commonalities exist throughout. Specifically, the terms ‘thoughts,’ ‘beliefs,’
‘meaning,’ ‘values,’ ‘learning,’ and ‘behavior’ are repeatedly mentioned. However, the
definitions undoubtedly hold distinct differences. Many focus on behavior and norms,
while others center on personal ideals. Each characterization describes an aspect of
culture, but there is no single description that combines the critical components of each
definition.
Proposed Model of Corporate Culture
In an attempt to fill this gap in the literature, the current project aspired to develop
a measure of corporate culture that combined major themes of previous instruments.
Specifically, culture was described as the sum of the Values, Meaning systems and
Behavioral expectations that exist within a corporation. Each domain was anticipated to
hold an equal role in the assessment of corporate culture.
Many of the aforementioned measures of corporate culture hold a values or beliefs
component. For the current project, this domain was designed to address the basic moral
expectations that employees use to assess daily events. The assessment of values is
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important because they have been shown to motivate and influence behavior
(Verplanken, & Holland, 2002).
The Meaning systems category was intended to describe the underlying mental
constructions that influence an employee’s perception of how events fit into their
personal narrative. Meaning systems are very challenging to assess. However, the
abstract construct is considered a central component of organizational culture. The way
an individual interprets their personal narrative has a significant role in their behaviors,
affect and psychological well-being (Frankl, 1963; Ryff, 1989).
The Behavior domain was included because it is an easily measured construct that
can provide clues about the characteristics of the ultimate culture. Many current culture
scales include behavior-related domains. This feature is significant because it reflects the
more tangible aspects of corporate culture. A pictorial representation of the author’s
model of corporate culture can be seen in Figure 1.
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Figure 1

Model of Corporate Culture

Behavior	
  

Culture	
  
Meaning	
  

Values	
  

The value of the proposed model lies in integration of shared meaning systems.
To this author’s knowledge, meaning systems have been considered by numerous
researchers (D’Andrade, 1996; Geertz 1973; Kessing & Strathern, 1998), but never
considered as part of a global model alongside values and behavioral expectations.
Typically, meaning (D’Andrade, 1996; Geertz 1973; Kessing & Strathern, 1998)
and values (Aceves & King, 1978; Cunningham & Gresso, 1994; Murphy, 1986) are
considered in unassociated models or in a single model as one catch-all factor. It is
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possible that researchers reject the simultaneous inclusion of both constructs in an effort
to avoid redundancy. This is seen as a critical mistake. Though meaning and values are
related, they refer to distinct human experiences. The inclusion of shared meaning
systems and values along with behavioral expectations makes the current model of
corporate culture unique, and more comprehensive than earlier conceptualizations of
culture. The subsequent sections will describe each of these three domains and explain
the related work of previous researchers.
Hypothesized Domains
Meaning Systems
Researchers believe all humans carry unique cognitive orienting systems (global
meaning systems) that influence the way they understand themselves, interpret
experiences and develop self-perceptions. These orienting systems are created over time,
as individuals continually identify patterns and themes in daily events (Park	
  and	
  
Folkman,	
  1997). This process has strong implications in the occupational setting.
Employees enter the work environment with preexisting orienting systems. However,
these meaning systems are eventually modified to fit the work environment. If all
employees experience events at work in a similar way, they develop similar meaning
systems. In this project, these common meaning systems are identified as “shared
meaning systems.”
The development and impact of shared meaning systems may be best described in
the following hypothetical example. If a male employee is raised in a misogynistic
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family, he may consider men to be better workers than women. At work, if a female
coworker is praised for her impressive work ethic and attention to detail, the male’s
preexisting meaning system will be challenged. If the work environment consistently
validates the skill of women, he will be forced to adjust his global meaning system over
time. This will change the way the male employee perceives himself and his female
counterparts. This will lead him to interact more genuinely with his female peers. If
other employees have a similar experience, a shared meaning system that reflects a
feminist ideology will develop.
In the above example, the change in the shared meaning system improves gender
cohesion and likely increases productivity. Due to the power of meaning systems, many
researchers have considered the value of the meaning in culture research. The
perspectives of Clifford Geertz, and Karl Weick are discussed below. 	
  
Clifford Geertz
Clifford Geertz was well known for describing culture as an ordered system of
meaning. Geertz’s explained that every aspect of human existence is controlled and
supported by an underlying meaning. He believed this fundamental meaning system was
the totality of culture. Geertz’s accepted the difficulty of studying meaning/culture, and
suggested that the construct be evaluated through a review of artifacts. Geertz noted that
artifacts of existence, such as human relationships, celebrations, and accomplishments,
survive as observable indicators of meaning/culture. (Geertz, 1973; Haukelid, 2008).
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Karl Weick 	
  
Karl Weick believes meaning making is a central process in all business practices.
In his 1995 publication, Sensemaking in Organizations, Weick noted that the human
process of sense making, defined as a human practice of assigning meaning to
experience, repeatedly occurs in organizations. The author posited that any event which
transpires within an organization becomes framed in a context of meaning as employees
continually appraise their physical surroundings and social environments in an effort to
understand a global purpose. Weick suggested that this meaning making process is not
passive. In addition to finding meaning as they are confronted by daily events,
employees also consider a universal meaning as they actively make short and long-term
decisions (Weick, 1995). 	
  
Values	
  
The importance of the values construct is two fold. First, the operation of a large
organization is dependent on the reliable behavior of employees presenting with varied
histories and experiences. In order for a diverse group of people to successfully connect
with each other and with the company, they must hold similar values and beliefs. This
connection and similar focus is central to culture. Second, values are known to directly
influence behavior (Schien, 2004). The control of employee behavior is often an ultimate
goal of corporate executives. In fact, culture is important because it is known to
influence behavior. Because values are seen as a strong link between culture and
behavior. The study of values has been a central component of many culture projects.
The views of Edgar Schein and Benjamin Schneider are briefly outlined below.
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Edgar Schein
Edgar Schein (2004) describes culture as a pattern of shared beliefs that are
developed and learned as a company overcomes periods of difficulty. When confronted
with challenges, a group must prevail, or fall short. Companies that prevail find value in
their achievements and develop a culture that supports successful behaviors. When new
members join the organization, they are quickly taught previously successful approaches
to thinking, feeling and behaving. Conversely, companies that do not overcome
challenges are not likely to duplicate the negative behavior. As a result, they do not
develop a strong culture. Schein notes that this understanding of culture explains why
changing culture is difficult. Companies that have found success, are not likely to
abandon a culture of success for untried approaches to business (Schein, 2004).
Benjamin Schneider
Benjamin Schneider shared that culture is best defined as a system of beliefs. In
1975, the author explained that the structure of an organization is valuable because it
influences the way employees perceive their roles. It changes their perspective and
adjusts their belief systems (Schneider, 1975). In 1996, Schneider, Brief, and Guzzo
discussed the connection between beliefs, values and culture. The authors explained that
“a good way to think about the culture of an organization…is to focus on what the people
in the organization worship.” They share that this focus on worship points to the
corporation’s values and beliefs, which are created by culture (Schneider, Brief, &
Guzzo, 1996).
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Behavioral Expectations	
  
Researchers are interested in the study of culture because they believe the
construct has the power to influence behavior. They are invested in the enhancement of
employee performance. The relationship between behavior and culture suggests that
behavioral expectation is a component of culture. In addition to being a desired outcome
variable, behavior is closely related to both meaning systems and values.
Humans are thought to seek congruence between their values and systems of
meaning, and their behaviors. Consequently, behaviors are heavily influenced by these
constructs (Schein, 2004; Weick, 1995). For example, individuals that value fidelity are
less likely to cheat on their partners. Similarly, people that find meaning in their physical
fitness are more likely to exercise. The significance of behavior is well known in the
study of culture. Since behavior can be easily observed and quantified, its influence has
been evaluated by numerous investigators. Below, the views of Marvin Harris, and
Terrance Deal and Allan Kennedy are highlighted.
Marvin Harris
Marvin Harris rejects the notion that culture must be interpreted as a collection of
values or meaning systems, or any other learned categorization. In fact, the author
reports that these additional considerations complicate the study of culture. Harris states
that culture should only be seen from a behavioral perspective. “The culture concept
comes down to behavior patterns associated with particular groups of peoples, that is, to
“customs,” or to “people’s way of life” (Harris, 2001). In this way, Harris worked to
simplify the study of culture. As an anthropologist, Harris supports his perspective by
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explaining that for years, anthropologists have thoroughly studied culture without
consideration for values, and meaning (Harris, 2001; Harris, 2004).
Terrance Deal & Allan Kennedy
Terrance Deal & Allan Kennedy are well know for describing corporate culture as
“the way we do things around here” (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Schein, 2004). Though the
authors explain that culture is an ethereal construct that involves meaning, values, and
beliefs, they report that culture is best understood through an assessment of behavior. For
example, they argue that a company’s rituals and ceremony’s can provide outstanding
insight into the company’s culture. Deal and Kennedy take interest in how members of a
company behave on a continual basis and how they interact during celebrations. They
provide an example of physicians washing their hands for seven minutes prior to surgery.
This ritual is unnecessary as germs are eliminated after 30 seconds of scrubbing. The
authors explain that this routine procedure reveals a culture focused on safety (Deal &
Kennedy, 1983).
In addition to focusing on celebrations and rituals, Deal and Kennedy suggest that
culture can be identified through an evaluation of a corporation’s heroes and heroines.
Most companies have employees or executives that are idolized as the perfect employee.
A review of these individuals’ behaviors can help illuminate the culture of the company.
As an example, Deal and Kennedy point to IBM’s Tom Watson and GE’s Charles
Steinmetz, both of whom passed away long ago. Each of these individuals remain highly
regarded in their respective companies, as currently employees continue to emulate there
behaviors (Deal & Kennedy, 1983).
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Corporate Safety Culture
Creating a model of corporate culture is important because it informs the
assessment process. With effective measurement, executives can evaluate their
companies, identify any weaknesses in culture, and make necessary changes. The ability
to identify limitations in operation is significant for any organization, but it is especially
important in companies working in high risk industries. Companies working in high-risk
industries, including mining, agriculture (fishing and forestry), construction,
transportation, wholesale trade and manufacturing, are constantly concerned with safety
related issues (Katz-Navon, Navah, & Stern, 2005). For companies in these industries, a
strong corporate safety culture is of paramount importance.
Empirical research validates an interest in safety culture, as investigators have
shown repeatedly that a robust culture of safety significantly reduces the overall risk of
workplace accidents. For example, in 1997 Judith Erikson completed a nationwide study
on the impact of corporate culture on safety performance. Using a survey to evaluate the
perceptions of employees, Erikson showed that when an organization’s management
team works to implement a culture of safety, safety performance and employee health
improve (Erickson, 1997).
These results were corroborated by Shannon, Mayr and Haines, (1997) who
reviewed the conclusions of ten studies that evaluated the connection between safety and
workplace factors. The authors’ analysis was comprehensive, as each study included in
the review had assessed at least 20 separate occupational settings. Shannon, Mayr and
Haines identified work place factors that were significantly correlated with injury rates.
31	
  
	
  

The significant factors fell under the following 4 headings: 1) Joint health and safety
committees, 2) Management style and culture, 3) Organizational philosophy, and 4)
workforce characteristics. The authors synthesized the results by identifying variables
that were significantly correlated with injury rates in at least 66% of the reviewed studies.
Safety culture and management style, though influential in each of the assessed factors,
was explicitly shown to be a significant predictor of reduced injury rates in 100% of the
studies evaluating this relationship.
In 2002, Michael O’Toole added to the literature by evaluating a large mining and
construction firm that altered its approach to safety in the year prior to the data collection.
The firm had made a change from a culture “driven by compliance to one driven by doing
the right thing to prevent accidents and injuries to employees”( O’Toole, 2002). By
evaluating the employees’ perceptions of the management’s devotion to safety, and
recording accident rates over a two year period, the author was able to identify a trend of
safety. Specifically, the subject company experienced a significant reduction in their
OSHA Lost Time Injury Rate. O’Toole, suggested that the decline in injury rates were
directly related to the company’s shift in safety culture (O’Toole, 2002).
Theoretical Perspectives of Safety Culture
As a characteristic of corporate culture, the construct of corporate safety culture
carries the same weaknesses. Researchers greatly value the construct, but differences in
conceptualization and theory prevent the development of a universally supported
definition of the construct. This theme was shown in Guldenund’s (2000) review of
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safety culture and safety climate definitions. The author identified seven published
definitions of safety culture, all of which were slightly different (Guldenund, 2000).
Significantly, the variation in the reviewed definitions matched the range of factors
suggested in the current project’s model of corporate culture.
Specifically, three definitions centered around values: a) “the attitudes, beliefs,
perceptions, and values that employees share in relation to safety” (Cox, & Cox, 1991),
b) “Set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and technical practices” (Pidgeon,
1991), c) “Assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals”
(International safety Advisory group, 1991). Two focused on behavior : a) The concept
that the organization’s beliefs and attitudes are manifested in actions, policies, and
procedures (Ostrom, Wilhelmsen, & Kaplan, 1993), b) The product of individual and
group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior (Lee, 1996).
Finally, two definitions pointed to the importance of meaning systems: a) “Everyone feels
responsible for safety and pursues it on a daily basis (Geller, 1994), b) “the collective
mental programming towards safety of a group of organization members (Berends,
1996).
Measurement of Corporate Culture
Given the allusive nature of corporate culture, it is no surprise that measurement
of the construct is limited by methodological inconsistencies. As researchers attempt to
measure corporate culture, they are confronted by significant challenges. To start, they
must support a single conceptualization. As was previously mentioned, this process can
33	
  
	
  

be very difficult as the diverse theoretical perspectives have led to a proliferation of
various conceptualizations of corporate culture.
After choosing a theoretical position, researchers must select between qualitative
and quantitative measurements. This is a highly debated issue in the study of corporate
culture. Many researchers advocate for quantitative measurement through the use of
questionnaires. This approach to measurement is valued because it allows for the quick
and cost-effective assessment of sizable groups of people (Guldenmund, 2007). When
working with large corporations, self administered questionnaire save resources. The
same questionnaire can be completed simultaneously by numerous participants and
quickly scored by a single investigator. Moreover, this approach encourages a high level
of consistency in scoring. When using choice-limited response formats, subjective
interpretation is eliminated. Another benefit of quantitative measurement is the ability to
acquire instant results, which can allow researchers to “produce medians or means,
compare subgroups and benchmark these” (Guldenmund, 2007).
Despite the advantages of quantitative measurement, many corporate culture
experts support the use of qualitative assessments (Guldenmund, 2007; Denison, 1996).
Guldenmund (2007) explained that the use of surveys is problematic because corporate
culture is a construct that is shared by employees. The author noted that
“in survey research, one is caught between the theoretical demands of
statistics (heterogeneous normally distributed variables around a single
mean obtained from a large population) and the theoretical requirements
of culture ([strong] convictions shared by groups or categories of people,
which are small enough to interact and create a culture about safety or any
other related topic)” (Guldenmund, 2007).
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More simply stated, statistical theory requires a large and diverse sample that comes in
opposition to corporate culture, which is created in smaller, homogeneous populations.
Guldenmund’s reservations about the use of quantitative methods have been
echoed by other investigators, who believe quantitative surveys do not accurately assess
the culture. These researchers argue that surveys usually address characteristics,
behaviors, and feelings associated with an organization. However, they do not consider
the participant’s underlying values and meaning systems. Essentially, most current
culture assessments measure climate, as opposed to culture (Denison, 1996; Mearns,
Whitaker, & Flin, 2001).
Culture Measurements Evaluated
Because the logistical advantages of quantitative measurement (time, money,
ease) are overwhelming, the purpose of the present project is to design an effective
survey-based quantitative measurement tool. The aspiration to develop a successful
quantitative measure of corporate safety culture is important because very few measures
of corporate culture and corporate safety culture exist. Those that are available for use are
theoretically limited and statistically weak. The following section describes the most
well-known corporate culture and corporate safety culture surveys. This review is
intended to inform the development of a new theory-based measure that more accurately
assesses safety culture.
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Organizational Culture Inventory	
  
The Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI) is a measure designed to evaluate a
corporation’s work-related behavioral norms across 12 organizational styles. 120 items
are used to assess the expectations across the following categories: “humanisticencouraging, affinitive, approval, conventional, dependent, avoidance, oppositional,
power, competitive, perfectionistic, achievement, and self actualizing” (Alexander,
1990). The OCI is considered a unique test because it purports to measure a participant’s
interpretation of their company’s culture, as opposed to the participant’s own thoughts
and behaviors. This difference in focus is believed to decrease personal bias and thus
make the measure more valid.
In addition to evaluating the style characteristics of the assessed corporation, the
OCI also identifies the corporation’s culture across the following culture categories:
Constructive, Passive/defensive, and Aggressive/Defensive. The results of the culture
categorization are used to provide information about the reviewed organizations’
strengths and weakness. Specifically positive outcomes are associated with constructive
cultures, while negative results are said to be related to the passive/defensive and
aggressive/defensive categories. The conclusions of the measure are cataloged in a
culture profile that is easy for a consumer to review and understand (Alexander, 1990).
The validity of these outcomes, with respect to organizational safety, are indeed unknown
(Alexander, 1990).
The OCI appears to have two major strengths. First, the test evaluates the
perceived culture of the company, as opposed each individual participant’s personal
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thoughts and behaviors. Second, the test produces a comprehensive explanation of a
studied company’s culture profile, which can be used help the company’s executives
improve upon their organization.
That said, the measure holds several limitations. First, the test creators have not
published any clear findings associated with the reliability or validity of the measure.
This lack of statistical support drastically limits the value of the measure. Similarly, no
explanation is provided regarding the selection of the three culture clusters or the 12 style
categories. It is unknown if these groupings have theoretical underpinnings.
Denison organizational culture survey
The Denison Organizational Culture Survey (DOCS) was developed by Denison,
a consulting firm based in Ann Arbor Michigan. Denison is well-known for their
specialization in executive coaching, corporate culture assessment and corporate culture
improvement. The foundation for all of Denison’s work is the “Denison Model,” a
conceptual model of an organization’s cultural-based characteristics. The company
reports that each of the Denison Model’s four global characteristics, (Mission,
Adaptability, Involvement and Consistency) must be maximized for a company to
operate effectively. Within each general characteristic, the Denison model includes three
trait indicators. Specifically, the Mission trait is indicated by: strategic direction and
intent, goals and objectives, and vision. The Adaptability characteristic is designated by:
creating change, customer focus, and organizational learning. The Involvement quality is
composed of: empowerment, team orientation and capability development. Finally, the
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Consistency trait is indicated by: core values, agreement, coordination and integration
(Denison, 2010).
The DOCS is used to evaluate the 12 separate indices, which are measured via 60
items. After the test has been completed by employees of a reviewed organization, the
scores are aggregated and compared to the norming sample. A final report provides
percentile scores, which show the percentage of the organizations in the normative group
that scored lower than the reviewed organization. With this information, an executive
team can make informed decisions about their corporation’s culture (Denison, 2010).
The DOCS clearly has many positive qualities. Perhaps most significant is the
applicability of the model for companies working in diverse settings. The consulting
company has experience using the test with over 1000 organizations operating in
numerous industries. The results of the test are comprehensive and easy to understand.
The limitations of this measure fall on its conceptual foundation. Although the Denison
Model completely describes organizational characteristics, only one of the indices
(values) addresses corporate culture. With this foundation, the DOCS seem to be more of
a climate survey than a culture survey. It is also important to note that, to this author’s
knowledge, Denison has not published any data regarding the DOCS’s reliability or
validity.
Safety Culture Measures Evaluated
Many researchers use general organizational culture surveys without considering
industry characteristics. It is clear, that the previously described surveys contain no
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reference of safety culture. This is problematic because safety culture carries industryspecific characteristics. Accordingly, it is likely the construct is best measured by safety
culture inventories. The following section will discuss the three most commonly used
safety culture instruments.
Safety Culture Survey (SCS) 	
  
The Safety Culture Survey (SCS) was designed by Safety Performance Solutions
(SPS), a consulting organization that specializes in helping other companies acquire a
“Total Safety Culture.” SPS explains that a total safety culture requires the identification
of barriers to safety performance. Accordingly, SPS created the SCS to act as a tool for
the discovery of cultural characteristics that thwart safety performance. The SCS is
specifically designed to evaluate employee’s perceptions of a reviewed company’s safety
culture. It is a 93-item measure, which questions employees about numerous aspects of
the current safety culture: 1) management support for safety, 2) peer support for safety, 3)
personal responsibility, 4) discipline, 5) incident reporting and analysis, 6) safety rules,
regulations, and procedures, 7) training, 8) safety suggestions and concerns, 9) rewards
and recognition, 10) safety audits and inspections, 11) communication, 12) employee
engagement, 13) safety meetings and committees, 14) miscellaneous (Safety Performance
Solutions, 2010).
Once completed, the results of the SCS are compiled and compared to the
norming sample. Currently, the SCS carries a norming sample of approximately 200,000
employees from hundreds of companies that have previously utilized the measure. This
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enables SPS to accurately describe a company’s current safety culture performance
(Safety Performance Solutions, 2010).
The SCS is a strong assessment that has been normed on a very large sample. It is
user-friendly and easy to interpret. The greatest strength of the survey lies in its domains.
With 14 separate domains, this test considers a large range of company characteristics.
Although the SCS carries many strengths, it is also limited in its evaluation of culture.
The extensive domain list is designed to assess a company’s current safety environment,
which best fits the definition of climate. There are no domains that directly address
meaning or values.
Safety Culture Values and Practices Questionnaire (QCS)
The QCS is an intricate measure that uses a double-pronged approach to assess
corporate safety culture. First, QSC uses a competing values framework to describe a
reviewed organization’s orientation towards safety. This process ranks the organization
across the following values: human relation or support, open system or innovation,
internal process or rules and rational goals or goal models. The test creators explain that
each of these orientations exist within all companies, but the different degrees of their
presences can provide insight into the safety of the organization (Diaz-Cabrera,
Hernandez-Fernaud, & Esla-Diaz, 2007).
In addition to identifying a reviewed company’s orientation towards safety, the
QSC also evaluates an organization’s safety practices across seven dimensions. The
seven dimensions are described as foundational components of safety culture. The
dimensions are: 1) training program content, 2) incident and accident reporting systems,
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3) orientation of safety rules and procedure, 4) performance appraisal and safety
promotion strategies, 5) motivation patterns used, 6) information and communication
systems, and 7) leadership styles (Diaz-Cabrera, Hernandez-Fernaud, & Esla-Diaz,
2007).
The strength of the QCS lies in its detailed approach to safety. By evaluating a
company’s culture, in addition to dimensions of safety, the measure endeavors to provide
a comprehensive view of a given organization’s safety orientations. However, the
limitation of this measure is found in the specific categories of culture. The QCS’s
competing values framework provides insight into the level of value within an
organization. However, the specific categories do not present a full picture of culture.
The domains are very specific, ignoring the role of meaning and focusing largely on
tangible aspects of the corporate climate.
Safety Culture Indicator Scale Measurement System	
  
The Safety Culture Indicator Scale Measurement System (SCISMS) is a safety
culture survey designed for use in high risk industries. Most recently, the test has been
widely used in the aviation industry. The test uses a four-factor model, including: 1)
organizational commitment, 2) formal safety indicators, 3) operations interactions, and 4)
informal safety indicators. Combined, each of these factors is purported to identify the
strengths and weaknesses of an evaluated organization. In an effort to increase the
measurability of the modes, each factor carries three concrete dimensions. Specifically,
organizational commitment is composed of: a) safety values, b) safety commitment, and
c) going beyond compliance. Formal safety indicators include the following: a) reporting
41	
  
	
  

system, b) response and feedback, and c) safety personnel. Operations interactions
consist of: a) supervisors/foremen, b) operations control/ancillary operations, and c)
instructors/training. Finally, informal safety indicators incorporates: a) accountability, b)
employee authority, and c) professionalism (Thaden, & Gibbons, 2008).
In addition to the aforementioned factors of safety culture, the SCISMS also
carries a correlated factor labeled Safety Behaviors/Outcomes. The authors use this
factor, composed of two dimensions: a) perceived personal risk/safety behavior, and b)
perceived organizational risk, as an outcome measure. The test creators believe safety
culture influences both corporate safety behavior, and perceptions of risk (Thaden, &
Gibbons, 2008).
The SCISMS is a powerful tool because it has strong empirical foundations,
which were used to identify the measured domains. The specific factors are
comprehensive and measurable through the more-tangible sub-categories. Moreover, this
survey carries high internal reliability. That said, the measure has the same weaknesses
as each of the previously mentioned surveys. It evaluates the concrete categories of
safety, but it is not a measure of culture. Culture is a subtle construct that includes
behaviors, values and meaning. The SCISMS does not measure these aspects of a
reviewed corporation.
Need for a new survey	
  
When reviewing the available measures of corporate culture and corporate safety
culture, it is clear that the current measures are deficient. Only two of the identified
measures hold a domain of corporate culture. These measures, the Safety Culture Values
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and Practices Questionnaire, and the Denison Organizational Culture Survey, are still
limited in the depth at which it addresses culture. This review highlights the need for an
empirically supported measure of corporate safety culture. A review of the evaluated
measures can be found in Table 2.

Table 2

Measures of Safety Culture

Measure
Organizational
Culture
Inventory

Author
Cooke &
Lafferty

Dimensions
(a) Constructive
(b) Passive/Defensive
(c)Aggressive/Defensive

Denison
Organizational
Culture
Survey

Denison
& Neale

(a) Mission
(b) Adaptability
(c) Involvement
(d) Consistency

Safety Culture
Survey

Safety
Performa
nce
Solutions

Safety Culture
Values and
Practices
Questionnaire

DiazCabrera,
Hernand
ezFernaud,
& EslaDiaz
Thaden
&
Gibbons

Safety Culture
Indicator Scale
Measurement
System

Weakness
1) Theory
2) No
statistical
support
1) Theory
(evaluates
values, but
no other
aspect of
culture)
2) No
statistical
support

Evidence
no reliability or
validity data

a) Management support for
Safety;
b). Peer Support for Safety; c).
Personal Responsibility; d)
Discipline; e). Incident
reporting; f) Safety Rules
Regulations g). Training; h)
safety Suggestions i) Rewards
and Recognition; j) Safety
Audits k) Communication l)
Engagement m) Safety Meetings
(a) Human Relation or Support,
(b) Open system or Innovation
(c) Internal Process or Rules
(d) Rational Goal or Goal
Models

1) Theory
(measures
climate)

No reliability or
validity data

1) Theory
(measures
values, but
no other
aspect of
culture)

No reliability or
validity data

(a)Organizational Commitment
(b) Formal Safety Indicators
(c) Operations Interactions
(d) Informal Safety Indicators

1) Theory
(measures
climate)

Alpha
coefficients
=.81-.95
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no reliability or
validity data

A review of the literature does not uncover a complete or comprehensive measure
of corporate culture or corporate safety culture. A perfect measure would include an
evaluation of each global domain of culture. To ensure validity, these overarching
domains would be empirically supported. In an effort fill the gaps in the literature, the
current project is designed to develop a measure of corporate safety culture that considers
the overarching domains of culture. These domains have been identified as: Meaning
systems, Values, and Behavioral expectations. To satisfy the need for an empirically
validated measure, the aforementioned domains will be subjected to statistical tests of
reliability and validity.
Analytic Methodology
The purpose of this project is to create a valid and reliable quantitative measure of
corporate safety culture. In the modern statistical era, researchers have the ability to use
many different statistical techniques when designing measurement tools. The following
section will discuss the benefits of factor analysis and explain the difference between
exploratory and confirmatory analyses.
Factor Analysis	
  
Factor analysis is an approach to test construction that was initiated by Charles
Spearman in 1904 as a tool to aid in intelligence test development. (Spearman, 1904 as
cited in Thompson, 2004). The difficulty inherent in intelligence test construction lies in
the numerous dimensions associated with the single concept identified as ‘intelligence’
(Gardner, 1999). Prior to Spearman’s work, the design of intelligence tests was limited.
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Because researchers were unaware of the particular variables measured by items on
prospective tests, they had no ability to ensure parsimonious and thorough evaluations.
Spearman responded to this problem by developing the statistical technique now called
‘factor analysis’ (Thompson, 2004).
Factor analysis is a statistical method that allows researchers to identify the latent
‘factors’ that control or influence the variation in several observed variables (Thompson,
2004). For example, a factor analysis of an intelligence test would show that individual
respondents typically answer questions related to addition, multiplication, subtraction and
division with similar proficiency. Questions associated with reading, vocabulary,
spelling and grammar are separately answered with related skill. This ‘grouping’ of
variables, identified through factor analysis, would reveal the existence of two separate
‘factors.’ In this example, these latent factors might be math and language respectively.
Factor analysis is critical to the test construction process as researchers are often
unaware of the underlying factor structure. Grouping the variables allows investigators
to develop theories and better understand measured constructs. In the example above, the
researcher would learn that ‘intelligence’ holds the factors of language and a math.
Factor analysis is also beneficial in test construction because it helps researchers identify
and improve the validity of a measure. By grouping variables that are answered
similarly, factor analysis highlights the items that ‘load together’ and simultaneously
draws attention to the items that do not. Items that load together are believed to have an
identifiable commonality (Devellis, 1991). This commonality is believed to validate the
existence of an underlying factor. Conversely, items that do not load with other items do
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not validate the presence of important factors. Instead, they appear uninfluenced by
underlying factors and reduce the validity of the test. By removing these isolated items, a
test creator can improve the validity of a measure (Thompson, 2004).
Exploratory Factor Analysis vs. Confirmatory Factor Analysis	
  
Two main forms of factor analysis exist: exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). EFA is the original and most common form of
factor analysis. It does not necessitate any theoretical assumptions or factor-related
expectations. EFA allows latent factors to be identified through unbiased statistical
analysis. EFA is most useful when researchers are interested in learning more about a
given construct and do not have solid theory regarding potential factors (Devellis, 1991;
Netemeyer, Bearden, & Sharma, 2003).
CFA on the other hand was more recently developed and requires “specific
expectation regarding (a) the number of factors, (b) which variables reflect given factors,
and (c) whether the factors are correlated” (Thompson, 2004). For researchers with
theories, CFA is often considered more valuable than EFA because the analysis is
directed to evaluate the specific theorized factors. This direct analysis, allows a
researcher to quantifiably assess the degree of model fit. In general, CFA produces more
specific results, though the investigator runs the risk of discovering that the theorize
model is grossly inaccurate. When this is the case, the researcher may employ EFA to
discover the latent factors (Thompson, 2004). In the present project, both EFA and CFA
were utilized. EFA was employed to identify an empirical model and CFA was
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employed to develop a experimental model. CFA was then utilized to compare the fit of
identified models.
Outcome Measurement	
  
In addition to developing a measure of corporate safety culture, this study also
endeavored to evaluate the value and importance of the survey. To assess the
relationship between the measure and safety behavior, an outcome variable of behavioral
frequency was assessed. This was challenging because, to this author’s knowledge, there
were no preexisting measures of safety behavior. Without a validated preexisting test, the
most efficient way to measure behavioral frequency as an outcome variable was to assess
a single behavioral frequency item with high face validity. The use of untested items to
assess an outcome raised some methodological questions. It was possible that the
assessed question was invalid, thus limiting the accuracy of the outcome assessment.
Despite these important concerns, extant research reveals that the use of new,
simple, face valid questions, can be used to assess research outcomes. Due to the high
level of face validity, there is little question about the items’ applicability to assessed
outcomes. The following section shows a precedent in test creation literature of the use
of this methodological practice.
In a study similar to the present project, Toll, O’Malley, McKee, Salovey, and
Krishnan-Sarin (2007) designed a measure of nicotine withdrawal. The authors used
CFA to validate the Minnesota Nicotine Withdrawl Scale. In an effort to add validity to
the scale, Toll et al. used an outcome measure of smoking behaviors. They did not have a
previously created and validated measure of smoking outcomes. Instead, they designed a
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behavioral frequency scale, which assessed for smoking frequency (“are you smoking?”).
The use of this binary outcome scale is very similar to the methodology used in the
current study, as a similarly objective question was asked: “Did you receive a
performance documentation form for using good safety practices during the past 12
months?” (Toll, et. al., 2007).
In a comparable project, Witte et. al. designed a measure of suicide risk. After
using EFA and CFA to identify the factor structure, the authors evaluated the new
measure’s predictive validity. To test validity, Witte et. al. asked binary questions: 1)
“Since you called the crisis center, have you tried to kill yourself?” 2) “Have you had any
thoughts of killing yourself since you called the crisis line?” These items had not been
validated, and were used as outcome measures.
In a unique study, Vitacco and Kosson (2010) validated a measure of
interpersonal psychopathology through the use of EFA and CFA. To gain predictive
validity, the researchers compared scores on the created test to antisocial personality
disorder symptoms (ASPD). The authors did not use a validated measure to assess
ASPD. Instead, they used a demographic questionnaire and a semi-structured interview.
Although this study does not use a new behavioral frequency scale, it shows that in the
development of a measure, it is acceptable to use outcomes measures that are not
validated (Vitacco & Kosson, 2010). It is believed that the diagnosis of ASPD through
interview is more subjective and less reliable than an evaluation of behavioral frequencies
through a fact-based face valid question.
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Summary
This chapter distinguished between the concepts of corporate culture and
corporate climate. The value of corporate culture and corporate safety culture was
discussed. The state of corporate culture theory was exposed. A new model of corporate
culture was proposed with Meaning systems, Values, and Behavioral Expectations as the
fundamental factors. Current corporate culture and corporate safety culture measures
were described. Limitations of content were identified in each measure. Finally,
exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis was described and evaluation
of an outcome measure was discussed.
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CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY
The present study was designed to create and validate a comprehensive measure
of corporate safety culture. This chapter describes the methodology that was used in the
development of the Corporate Safety Culture Scale (CSCS). It includes an explanation of
the planning, construction, evaluation, and validation of the instrument.
Research Design
The project used factor analysis and structural equation modeling to design and
evaluate the CSCS. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used to develop an empirical
model. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was employed to present the experimental
model, containing the predicted components: Meaning systems, Values, and Behavioral
expectations. The model fit of each developed model was assessed and compared. After
identifying the model with best fit, the researcher used a one-way between groups
analysis of variance to appraise the relationship between safety behavior and scores on
the CSCS.
Planning
The development of the CSCS was important because current measures of
corporate safety culture are limited in their theoretical foundations. Theorists have used
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myriad definitions to describe corporate culture and corporate safety culture. When
reviewing the current definitions, several themes are apparent. Specifically, there is often
reference to employee behavior, values, and shared meanings. Though there seems to be
some agreement on the importance of these constructs, no single definition of corporate
culture includes each of these factors. The development of a theory-based test is also
significant because only two identified measures of corporate safety culture are shown to
have a theoretical foundation. These measures, the Safety Culture Values and Practices
Questionnaire and the Denison Organizational Culture Survey, each hold only one of the
aforementioned factors of corporate culture.
Based on the limitations of the existing theories and related measures, the purpose
of the current project was to develop a more successful measure of corporate safety
culture. In an effort to honor the themes of previous definitions, the present study’s
description of corporate culture holds that culture is the sum of organizations’ shared
meanings, values, and behavioral expectations.
Participants	
  
Organization	
  
Approximately 41% of all workplace accidents occur during periods of
transportation (U.S. Department of Labor, 2010). It is evident that within the
transportation industry safety culture is extremely important. Due to the significance of
safety in transportation, participants for the current project were recruited from the
Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT).
The Colorado Department of Transportation is a state-run organization that
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manages public transportation within Colorado. The CDOT website reports that the
organization manages over “28 billion vehicle miles of travel” annually in the state of
Colorado. Along with controlling the 9144 mile Interstate system, bridges and smaller
roads, CDOT also supports other forms of transportation, including aviation, within
Colorado. Additionally, the department of transportation assists local law enforcement
agencies as they work to improve safe traveling behaviors (Colorado Department of
Transportation, 2011).
From its inception in 1991, CDOT has placed great importance on safety. The
value of safety is revealed in the company’s mission statement: “To provide the best
multi-modal transportation system for Colorado that most effectively and safely moves
people, goods, and information.” To emphasize their desire for a low incident rate,
CDOT lists safety as the first of their six core values (Colorado Department of
Transportation, 2011).
Because safety is critically important to CDOT, the executive team responded
strongly when, in 2009, researchers produced a report on CDOT’s behalf indicating that
the organization recorded more incidents than similar public transportation departments
and comparable private organizations (Chinowsky, & Hallowell, 2009). In an effort to
evaluate the safety-related climate at CDOT, the organization’s safety committee planned
to administer an internally created safety survey that was completed by CDOT employees
in 2006 and 2007. See Appendix C.
CDOT Recruitment
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The investigator contacted the Colorado Department of Transportation’s training
academy director, via email. The director previously worked with the University of
Denver, and openly noted his interest in corporate culture. As a result of his interest in
the topic, the training academy director quickly organized a meeting between, himself,
the investigator, and a CDOT executive. In the meeting, the CDOT representatives
agreed to partner with the investigator on this project in exchange for the results of the
study, including feedback and recommendations regarding the organization’s safety
culture.
Individuals
As was previously mentioned, prior to being contacted by the investigator, CDOT
executives planned to administer a safety climate survey that was completed in 2006 and
2007. For the purposes of the present project, CDOT allowed the researcher to add items
to the previously created measure to create a shorter test within the larger measure.
Specifically, the CDOT survey held a total of seventy questions, twenty-four of which
were attributed to the CSCS. The final version of the survey was electronically
distributed to all 3,349 CDOT employees. The survey received a strong response rate of
approximately 57%. In total 1909 surveys were fully completed.
Although all CDOT employees were asked to complete the survey, only responses
provided by a specific group of employees were eligible for analysis as part of the present
project. In particular, there were three eligibility requirements for participation in the
study. First, in an effort to gain the best perspective on safety, responses provided by
participants working in high risk positions were evaluated. Specifically, this included
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employees working in divisions of transit and rail, and the maintenance division. Second,
participants did not hold managerial positions within their organizations. This
requirement was intended to reduce respondent bias. It was believed that higher-ranking
employees would be more invested in the outcomes of the study and more aware of
efforts made to implement a culture of safety. Lower ranking employees were thought to
be less familiar with executive mandates, and thus more likely to accurately describe the
safety culture of CDOT. Finally, all evaluated participants were between the ages of 18
and 65. This age limitation was important as it allowed the researcher to assess the most
typical segment of employees working in high-risk industries.
Consideration was also given to the participant’s tenure as CDOT employees. It
was believed that employees who had been employed for longer periods of time would
have a better understanding of the corporate safety culture. However, due to sample size
necessities, the investigator was unable to exclude employees with limited tenure at
CDOT. Please see Table 3 for tenure statistics
Table 3

Tenure Statistics

Years of Tenure
0-5

N
413

6-10

203

11-15

130

21+

64
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Prior to commencement of this project, the researcher anticipated measuring the
effects of demographic differences amongst the participants. However the CDOT safety
committee was unwilling to record demographic information because they deemed the
information to be unnecessary. Specifically, they did not allow for the inclusion of
questions associated with race, ethnicity, gender, age, SES, or education level. The
researcher was forced to accept this limitation. With this restriction, the results must be
interpreted with care. They likely only generalize to similar state departments of
transportation. 	
  
Construction
Corporate Safety Culture Scale: Item Pool
This study was completed to create a measure of corporate safety culture.
Several steps were followed in the development of the item pool. First, the principle
investigator completed a comprehensive review of the literature. The extant literature
clearly revealed fragmented research. Corporate culture has been understood through
numerous theoretical positions, which has lead to a significant number of diverse
instruments. No single instrument was found to bridge the gap between the different
theories.
With the goal of creating a more well-rounded and inclusive instrument, the
investigator attempted to connect the theories by organizing the research into overarching
thematic categories. The following three groupings were identified: shared Meaning
systems, Values, and Behavioral expectations. The recognition of three global themes
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led to the hypothesis that corporate culture is a large construct that is composed of the
previously mentioned three themes, or factors. The factors described above are further
defined in Table 4.

Table 4

Factors of Corporate Culture

Factors
Meaning Systems:

Explanation
Meaning Systems are underlying mental
constructions that allow for the
interpretation and understanding of how
daily events fall into an individual’s
personal narrative.

Values:

Values represent the fundamental moral
expectations that an individual uses to
appraise daily events.

Behavioral Expectations:

Behavioral Expectations refers to the
activities that are anticipated within the
course of an individual’s employment
responsibilities.

Potential items of the CSCS were developed conceptually, following an attempt to
create items consistent with the three themes. The author generated approximately 10
items per theme. Then, in conjunction with the dissertation chair the investigator reduced
the item pool by eliminating unnecessary items. In total 25 new items were retained,
with at least 8 items in each domain. All items were given a six option Likert response
format with a continuum ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
Corporate Safety Culture Scale: Cognitive Interviews	
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As was recommended by DeVellis (1991), the investigator met with the CDOT
executive safety committee to ensure applicability of the survey items. Members of this
committee held expertise in safety, culture, risk, survey development, and the
transportation industry. All members were high ranking CDOT employees. The
committee was composed of members holding the following positions within CDOT:
Training Academy Director-Organizational Psychologist, Maintenance Superintendent,
Traffic Engineer, Tunnel Superintendent, Risk Management Unit Supervisor, Regional
Safety Manager, and Maintenance Superintendent.
During the meeting, the committee read through and discussed the applicability,
value, and composition of each item suggested as part of the new measure. The
investigator used the recommendations provided by the committee to develop a final
version of the CSCS. In total, the measure held twenty-four items.
Corporate Safety Culture Scale: Expert Review	
  
In an effort to improve the validity of the items, the survey was evaluated by 23
graduate students at the University of Denver. The students were asked to assess the
extent to which each proposed survey item addressed the intended culture domains. The
reviewers recorded their evaluations by completing an attached rating form (see
Appendix B). The form held a definition for each proposed domain, and allowed for each
item to be rated for relevance to the anticipated components.
On balance, the evaluators concluded that each of the items was better than a
“good fit.” However to ensure that only valid items were used, the investigator
eliminated all items that were given a mean score that was less than an “excellent fit.”
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This required the investigator to eliminate 7 items. With the unsatisfactory items
eliminated, the final version of the SCSC was identified. The item pool held 18 items,
with at least 5 items predicted to load on each proposed domain.
Quantitative Evaluation
Procedures
The CSCI was administered to all 3,349 CDOT employees. After the test results
were gathered, data from non-eligible participants was discarded. In total, the data
provided by 907 employees was retained. The investigator started by randomly sorting
the sample into two groups. The groups, identified as groups “A” and “B” from here
forward, each held approximately 50% of the total sample.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
Group “A” was submitted to an exploratory factor analysis to identify the
empirical factor structure. This analysis started with an evaluation of the assumptions.
The assumptions of sample size, outliers, factorability of the correlation matrix, linearity
were tested. The sample was modified to ensure that the expectation of each assumption
was achieved.
Principle components analysis was used to reduce the data and identify the most
robust independent factors. The identification of the empirical model required the
assessment of Communalities, Eigen values, the pattern matrix, and the Scree Plot. At
each step, items shown to diminish the power of factor loadings were removed.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
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The second analysis, using group B, started with an appraisal of the assumptions
of normality and reliability. Again, the sample was modified to meet the requirements of
each assumption. Using Amos software, group B was used to evaluate the model fit of
the empirical model and the experimental model, composed of the originally theorized
items and domains. The investigator completed theoretically supported modifications to
improve model fit. Model fit was evaluated and compared using the following fit
indices: Chi-squared (χ2), Root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), Bentler
comparative fit index (CFI), and Expected cross-validation index (ECVI).
The χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic is a fundamental assessment of model fit. The
value evaluates the difference between the “sample and fitted covariance matrices”	
  (Hu
and Bentler, 1999). The null hypothesis holds that there is no significant difference
between the observed and expected values. Accordingly a significant χ2 value suggests
the model does not adequately fit the data (Kline, 2011). While the χ2 goodness-of-fit
statistic is an essential value of model fit, it does carry significant limitations. In
particular, it is easily skewed by sample size. In the current project, with group samples
greater than 400, the χ2 statistic was likely to be significant despite the possibility of only
minor data discrepancies (Kline, 2011).
The root-mean-square error of approximation is an absolute fit index that follows
a non-central χ2 distribution. It estimates the model parameter’s ability to limit the
population covariance (Thompson, 2004). RMSEA is considered a “badness-of-fit index
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where zero indicates that best fit” (Kline, 2011). An acceptable RMSEA value is lower
than, or equal to, .08 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993)
The Bentler comparative fit index	
  is	
  an	
  incremental	
  fit	
  index,	
  which	
  evaluates	
  
the	
  relative	
  enhancement	
  of	
  the	
  presented	
  model	
  fit	
  over	
  that	
  of	
  the	
  independence	
  
model	
  (Kline, 2011). Incremental fit indexes can be criticized because they assume zero
covariances among observed variables. However, when evaluated along with other fit
indices, such as the RMSEA, they provide helpful information. Researchers believe the
CFI threshold for adequate fit if greater than, or equal to, .95 (Hu and Bentler, 1999).
The expected cross-validation index is used to compare non-nested models. Nonnested models are structures that do not carry the same variables. Nested models, on the
other hand, hold the same variables, and can be differentiated only through an additional
subset of parameters present in one of the identified structures (Maruyama, 1998). The
ECVI, is designed to contrast non-nested models, carrying different variables. The index
helps an investigator select the model with that has will best cross-validate in a similar
sample. The ECVI of a single model presents very little information. However, when
comparing the ECVI values to multiple models, the index can be used to rank cross
validation capacities. The model with the lowest ECVI is thought to have the best fit
(Browne & Cudeck, 1989).
Validation
After identifying the model with the best fit. The full sample was submitted to an
analysis of variance. This statistical technique was used to further assess the developed
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scale’s validity. Specifically, the relationship between scores on the CSCS and scores on
a self-report behavioral frequency item were evaluated.
Summary
This chapter discussed the methodology that was used in the study. This included
an explanation of each phase of test construction. Specific attention was given to the
research design, participant recruitment, test development, and quantitative assessment.
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CHAPTER 4

RESULTS
This chapter describes the results and conclusions of the scale development
phases discussed in Chapter 3. It also highlights the results of the research questions
introduced in Chapter 1. In an effort to provide a linear depiction of this study’s findings,
this chapter begins with a discussion of the phase 1 and phase 2 results. Because these
stages of scale development were described in detail as part of chapter 3, the discussions
attributed to these phases within this chapter are limited to brief summaries. This chapter
then continues with a more thorough report of the phase 3 and 4 findings. The results
section is concluded by an explanation of the research findings.
Planning
Participants
In exchange for the results of this project, the Colorado Department of
Transportation (CDOT) agreed to participate in the study. In total, 1,909 CDOT
employees (60% response rate) completed the measure. After eliminating ineligible
individuals, 907 employees were retained as participants in the study.
Construction
Corporate Safety Culture Scale
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To ensure that the items created for the CSCS were applicable to the
transportation industry, a cognitive interview was held with the CDOT Safety
Committee. Through the cognitive interview, the items pool was paired down to twentyfour items, with approximately 8 items addressing each of the established domains. The
item pool was then submitted to an expert review. In this step, designed to increase
validity, the items pool was distributed to a group of 23 graduate students. The students
assessed the extent to which each item addressed the intended culture domain. Those
items that were not shown to have “very good” fit were eliminated. After this process,
the following nineteen items remained:
Q6 Employees feel free to report safety hazards
Q8 Employee safety is not sacrificed for production during a job
Q16 I know how to avoid safety hazards
Q18 Employees are encouraged to fix safety hazards
Q20 Employee safety is not sacrificed for speed during a job
Q22 My coworkers look out for my safety
Q30 I am encouraged to raise safety concerns
Q32 Employee safety is not sacrificed for quality during a job
Q40 I pride myself on my ability to work safely
Q41 Safety is more important than productivity
Q42 I hope to be known as a safe worker
Q43 CDOT personnel usually follow safety guidelines
Q44 Safety at work is as important as safety at home
Q46 The most important part of completing a job is being safe
Q47 I would rather be a safe employee than a productive employee
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Q49 I can prevent and avoid accidents through my personal actions
Q51 The best employees are usually the safest employees
Q52 My coworkers see me as a safe worker
Q53 Safe employees should be rewarded
Qualitative Analysis
Tests of Assumptions: Sample size, Factorability of the correlation matrix, Linearity
The assumption of sample size was met by with the starting sample
of 907 cases. The large sample allowed for the use of a split file analysis (A=EFA)
(B=CFA) while maintaining an adequate number of cases (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).
The factorability of the correlation matrix was clearly shown, as the correlation matrix,
complete with each anticipated item, revealed many relationships of r=.3 or greater.
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity was significant at the p<.001 level. This revealed that the
variables were not independent. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value was .931, showing that
the sample was appropriate for factor analysis. Linearity was assumed after the
completion of several random evaluations of variable combinations. There was no
evidence of curvilinear relationships.
Tests of Assumptions: Outliers
Outliers were identified using the Mahalanobis distance. This statistic describes
the standard distance between “a set of scores for an individual case and the sample
means for all variables (Kline, 2011). By comparing the Mahalanobis distance scores for
each variable with the chi-squared critical values, cases with multivariate outliers were
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detected. Cases with Mahalanobis distance scores greater than 43.82 (df=19, p< .001)
were eliminated. In total, seventy cases were removed.

Research Question #1
How well does the experimental factor structure of the Corporate Safety Culture Scale fit
the data, when compared to an empirically derived factor structure?
This section provides an explanation of experimental factor structure, and
compares its fit with empirically derived models. Exploratory factor analysis was used to
obtain the empirical factor structure. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to test the
experimental model, along with the empirical model and a modified empirical model.
CFA was used to compare the model fit of each of the aforementioned models. This fit
was identified using the criteria discussed in chapter three.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
By exploring the independent variance carried by the variables, Exploratory
Factor Analysis (EFA) enabled the researcher to identify the empirical model. In the
segment below, the steps taken to uncover the empirical structure are identified. The
discussion starts by presenting an explanation of Principle Components Analysis, the data
reduction technique selected for this project. The conclusions of the analysis are
presented with an evaluation of communalities, Eigen values pattern matrices, structural
matrices, the scree plot, and correlations of identified components. At each step, the
decision making process is explained.
Principle Components Analysis
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Principle components analysis (PCA) was identified as the optimal analysis for
the purposes of this project. PCA is a data reduction technique that accounts for the
greatest amount of data variance with the fewest of factors. PCA is different from other
factor analytic techniques because it evaluates the shared and unique error variance of
each factor. As a result, the variability accounted by each factor is maximized.
Moreover, the identified factors are independent, and do not correlate with one another.
Communalities
Communalities are important as they reveal the extent to which an item’s variance
is explained by the extracted factors. With this data, essentially a correlation coefficient,
the investigator was able to identify items that did not fit well with the extracted items.
Costello & Osborne (2005) reported that items with low values, less than .4, need to be
removed, or accommodated, through the creation of additional factors. Because no items
in this project held commonalities values below .4, all items were retained.
Eigen values
Eigen values describe the amount of variance that is accounted by each factor.
The Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 1960), suggested that Eigen values greater than or equal to
one can be considered stable. The Principal components analysis revealed four factors
carrying Eigen values that met this standard. These four factors accounted for 65.14% of
variance. The Eigen values attributed to each identified factor, and their claimed
variance can be seen in Table 5.

66	
  
	
  

Table 5

Total Variance Explained

Component

Eigen values

% Variance

1
2
3
4

6.709
3.565
1.086
1.016

35.312
18.764
5.717
5.348

Cumulative
Variance
35.312
54.076
59.793
65.141

However, after evaluating the pattern matrix, and eliminating items that were
cross loaded, two factors were identified. The specified factors were submitted to
Oblimin rotation, which allows for the correlation of factors and leads to greater Eigen
values. The rotation resulted in a between factors correlation of .25. When evaluating
the “elbow” depicted in the scree plot, the decision to select 2 factors was confirmed.
The amount of variance explained by the first two components was much greater than the
variance explain by the last ten components. The Scree plot can be seen below in Figure
2.
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Figure 2

Scree Plot

During the analysis of the Pattern Matrix, the following six items were dropped
from the scale because they were shown to load on at least two factors.
Q16 =I know how to avoid safety hazards
Q43= CDOT personnel usually follow safety guidelines
Q47= I would rather be a safe employee than a productive employee
Q49= I can prevent and avoid accidents through my personal actions
Q52=My coworkers see me as a safe worker
Q53=Safe employees should be rewarded
Based on the suggestions of Tabachnick & Fidell, (2001) factors with loadings of
.40 or greater were extracted and identified. Items loading on factor one addressed
behavioral and performance and expectations. Accordingly, this factor was identified as
“Behaviors.” The second identified factor seemed to hold items created to measure
values held by employees. Accordingly, This factor was labeled “Values.” Two items
found in this factor (Q40= I pride myself on my ability to work safely, and Q42= I hope
to be known as a safe worker), were originally anticipated to fall into the “meaning”
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domain. However, objective review indicated that they clearly addressed underlying
values.
One item, (Q51=The best employees are usually the safest employees) was
removed because it carried a factor loading below .4 and could not be extracted. The
resulting pattern matrix can be seen below in Table 6. The mean and standard deviations
of the identified factors is shown in Table 7.
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Table 6
ID

Pattern Matrix

Q6

Component
1
2
.770

Item

Domain

Employees feel free to report safety hazards

Behavior

Q8

.840

Employee safety is not sacrificed for production
during a job

Behavior

Q18

.787

Employees are encouraged to fix safety hazards

Behavior

Q20

.871

Employee safety is not sacrificed for speed during a
job

Behavior

Q22

.483

My coworkers look out for my safety

Behavior

Q30

.794

I am encouraged to raise safety concerns

Behavior

Q32

.876

Employee safety is not sacrificed for quality during
a job

Behavior

Q40

.825

I pride myself on my ability to work safely

Values

Q41

.781

Safety is more important than productivity

Values

Q42

.864

I hope to be known as a safe worker

Values

Q44

.833

Safety at work is as important as safety at home

Values

Q46

.849

The most important part of completing a job is
being safe

Values
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Table 7

Mean and Standard Deviation

Factors
1
1 Behavior
1
2Values
.214**
Mean
31.54
SD
3
**significant at the .01 level

2
1
37.84
7

Tests of Assumptions: Normality
Because multivariate normality is assumed for the following analysis, the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov value was evaluated. The statistic (p<.001) revealed a violation of
the normality assumption. Accordingly, skewness statistics were used to inform variable
transformation. However, square root, inverse, reflect, and logarithmic transformations
did not improve normality within the variables. Accordingly, the original data was
retained. The original skewness and kurtosis values are listed below in Table 8. As is
shown, the kurtosis values for all variables were within the normal assumed range except
Q44.
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Table 8

Skewness and Kurtosis

Variable

N

Skewness of Original
Variable
Behavior Items

Kurtosis of
Original Variable

Q6: Employees feel free
to report safety hazards
Q8: Employee safety is
not sacrificed for
production during a job
Q18: Employees are
encouraged to fix safety
hazards
Q20: Employee safety is
not sacrificed for speed
during a job
Q22: My coworkers
look out for my safety
Q30: I am encouraged to
raise safety concerns
Q32: Employee safety is
not sacrificed for quality
during a job

436

-1.26

1.33

436

-.75

-.233

436

-1.34

2.20

436

-.84

.06

436

-1.10

436

-1.50

436

-.88

1.83
2.31
.31

Values Items
Q40: I pride myself on
my ability to work
safely
Q41: Safety is more
important than
productivity
Q42: I hope to be known
as a safe worker
Q44: Safety at work is
as important as safety at
home
Q46: The most
important part of
completing a job is
being safe

436

-.64

.91

436

-1.52

2.68

436

-.89

1.53

436

-1.36

3.31

436

-1.07

1.46

Test of Reliability
To ensure that the developed scale was consistent and dependable, the reliability
of the scale defined in the empirical model was tested prior to further evaluation. Items
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with low item-total correlations were removed from the scale. Question 22 was
eliminated from the Behavior scale, (r=.53). No items were dropped from the Values
scale, as they all had item-total correlations greater than .60. An appraisal of the two
domains and the full scale’s reliability is depicted below in Table 9. DeVellis, (1991)
suggested that Cronbach’s Alpha values above .7 are acceptable.
Table 9

Cronbach’s Alfpha Values

Behavior Domain

Number of Items
6

Alpha
.915

Values Domain

5

.88

Full CSCS

11

.885

Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Empirical Model
The researchers started the assessment of model fit by testing the empirical model
developed though discussed Exploratory Factor Analysis. This measurement model can
be viewed in Figure 4. The following fit indices were assessed to compare the fit of the
empirical model with that of the experimental structure: χ2, RMSEA, CFI, and ECVI.
The fit indices resulting from the empirical model are listed in Table 11.
The evaluated indices revealed an inconsistent depiction of model fit. The chisquared value (χ2 = 307.5, df = 43, p<.0001) showed that a significant discrepancy existed
between the sample and hypothesized covariance matrices. The RMSEA (.119) did not
quite meet the standards for a strong model fit. However, the CFI (.917) statistic did
describe an acceptable model fit. The empirical model was shown to carry an ECVI
score of .813.
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Experimental Model
In order to provide a comparison of model fit, the investigator’s initial
experimental structure was developed and evaluated. The experimental model was
composed of the nineteen items initially submitted to analysis. The inclusion of all
nineteen items was unique to the experimental model. Prior to the CFA, several items
were removed from analysis due to cross loading, low factor loading, and low item total
correlations. The empirical and modified empirical models were developed with the
remaining eleven items. Because the experimental model was developed with all
nineteen items in mind, the eliminated items were retained for the model. For clear
depiction of the items included in each model structure see Table 10.
The experimental model, composed of the initial nineteen items, held seven items
designed to measure meaning, five items designed to evaluate values, and eight items
intended to assess behavioral expectations. The completed structure is shown in Figure
5. The model was evaluated using the following fit indices: χ2, RMSEA, CFI, and ECVI.
The experimental model was not shown to improve the model fit. When
compared to the empirical model, the identified indicators revealed a reduced fit.
Specifically, the χ2 score (χ2 = 683.048 df = 149, p<.0001) was clearly poorer than that
of the other tested model. The RMSEA (.091) was only a slight improvement on the
empirical model, and the CFI (.888) score revealed a fit that was inferior to that of the
empirical model. When compared to the empirical model, the ECVI value of 1.76
showed that experimental model did not have a strong fit. See Table 11 for a depiction of
the model fit indices.
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Modifications to Empirical Model
Because the experimental and empirical models did not present an adequate fit,
the investigator evaluated a third model, a modified empirical model. The original
empirical structure narrowly missed adequate model fit, so the investigator consulted the
modification indices to improve model fit. Through this process, the researcher identified
three suggested modifications that had both large modification index values and
conceptual support. It was shown that the unexplained error of the following items was
correlated.
Q18 Employees are encouraged to fix safety hazards (MI=98.085)
Q30 I am encouraged to raise safety concerns
Q6 Employees feel free to report safety hazards
Q30 I am encouraged to raise safety concerns

(MI=59.275)

Q40: I pride myself on my ability to work safely
Q42: I hope to be known as a safe worker

(MI 20.773)

In each of the three chosen modifications, the language, or theme of the items
were similar. Due to these similarities, the correlation in unexplained error made
conceptual sense. These similarities were not perceived to be as significant in any other
pair of survey items. Specifically, Q18 and Q30 were comparable questions, using
similar wording. Both items held the terms “encouraged,” and “safety.” Further, both
items referred the resolution of safety problems. In the same way, Q40 and Q42 carried
equivalent language that likely caused the correlation of errors. Most clearly, both items
carried the words “I,” “safe,” and “work.” Additionally, both Q40 and Q42 held a theme
of self-reflection. Q30 and Q6 were also both associated with the identification, and
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report of safety problems. As in the other selected modifications, the relationship
between error terms was supported by the similarity in item purpose and language.
When accounting for the relationship between the previously mentioned error
terms, the resulting model demonstrated in an overall acceptable model fit. The chisquared value of (χ2 = 126.54 df = 40, p<.001) was overlooked due to the large sample
size. The RMSEA value (.071) suggested a strong fit, and the CFI (.978) confirmed an
adequate fit. Further, the ECVI score showed that when compared with the experimental
model, the modified empirical model had the best fit. The path analysis of this
measurement model can be seen in Figure 4. See Table 11 for a description of the fit
indices.
Table 10

Model Composition
Empirical and Modified Empirical Models

Retained Items

Q6, Q8, Q18, Q20,
Q30, Q32, Q40,
Q41, Q42, Q44,
Q46

Eliminated Items—Reasons for elimination
Cross Loading
in Pattern
Matrix
Q16, Q43,
Q47, Q49,
Q52, Q53

Carried Factor
Low Item
Loading Below
Total
.4
Correlations
Q51
Q22
Q6, Q8, Q16,
Q18, Q20,
Q22, Q30,
Q32, Q40,
Q41, Q42,
Q43, Q44,
Q46, Q47,
Q49, Q51,
Q52, Q53
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Experimental
Model
All Items
Retained

Table 11

Comparison of Fit Indices for Tested Models

Tested Models

Fit Indices
χ2

DF

Sig

RMSEA

CFI

ECVI

307.5

43

<.001

.119

.917

.813

Modified Empirical Model 126.54 40

<.001

.071

.973

.410

Experimental Model

<.001

.091

.888

1.76

Empirical Model

683.04 149

Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Summary
When considering the results shown by the evaluated fit indices, it is clear that
corporate safety culture is a complex construct that, given the developed items, is best
measured through the domains identified in the modified empirical model. It is important
to note the domains contained in this factor structure retain experimental support. This is
shown in similarities between the modified empirical model and the experimental model.
Specifically, both models hold domains related to behavioral expectations, and values.
The similarity between the modified empirical model and the original experimental
framework adds support for the conclusions of the CFA.
Validation
Research Question #2
Is there a relationship to between scores on the Corporate Safety Culture Scale and
safety behaviors?
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After identifying a reliable model, the validity of the CSCS was evaluated. The
researcher endeavored to understand how well the CSCS, along with each identified
component of the measure, related to safety behavior. This assessment was completed
with the use of a single behavioral indicator item found in the full CDOT measure. The
selected item is listed below.
Q61 I received a performance documentation form for using good safety practices during
the past 12 months.
Tests of Assumptions: Homogeneity
Prior to completing the statistical analysis, the assumption of homogeneity was
evaluated. Levene’s test of homogeneity showed that the assumption of homogeneity of
variance was achieved by the CSCS (p=.071) and the Value domain (p=.474). However,
the Behavior domain was shown to have significant homogeneity (p=.01). To
accommodate this violation, the Welsh test was consulted when comparing groups.
Analysis of Variance
A one-way between groups analysis of variance was completed in effort to assess
the relationship between safety behavior, measured through the above item, and scores on
the full Corporate Safety Culture Scale, and the individual factors. Participants were
divided into three groups based on their answer to the previously mentioned frequency
item. The available response groups were: “Yes,” “No,” and “Not Sure.” Scores on the
full CSCS and the Behavior domain were both shown to be significantly different, at the
p<.001 level for subjects in the three behavioral frequency groups. Similarly, scores on
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the value domain were statistically different at the p<.05 level for subjects in the different
frequency groups. This finding was corroborated by the conclusions of the Welsh test.
A review of the descriptive statistics, shown in Table 11, describes the direction
of the differences between the “Yes,” “No,” and “Not Sure” groups. For the full scale,
and each of the identified domains, the “Yes” group was shown to have a higher mean
score than the “No” and “Not Sure” group. This finding suggests that high scorers on the
CSCS are safer employees than those who score lower. For a visual depiction of these
findings please see Figures 7, 8, 9.
Table 12

Descriptive Statistics

Statistical Measures
N
Mean
SD

Yes
233
65.36
7.39

Statistical Measures
N
Mean
SD

233
65.36
7.39

Statistical Measures
Yes
233
31.92
2.7

N
Mean
SD

Full CSCS
Identified Groups
No
504
62.62
8.36
Behavior Domain
Identified Groups
504
62.63
8.36
Values Domain
Identified Groups
No
504
31.39
3.03

Not Sure
100
63.36
7.2
100
63.36
7.2
Not Sure
100
31.23
3.34

Effect Size
While the participants in the different behavioral frequency groups were shown to
have significantly different scores on the CSCS, and the Value and Behavior domains,
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the effect size for these findings was shown to be small (Cohen, 1988). Specifically, the
eta squared value for the full measure was .022. The Behavior domain carried a similarly
low score of .022, and the Values domain was the lowest, at .007.

Post Hoc
Tukey HSD Post hoc tests provided more information about significant
differences shown between participants in the three behavioral frequency groups. The
statistic showed that on the full CSCS, the average value for the “Yes” group was
significantly (p<.001) different from the “no” group. However, neither the “Yes” group
nor the “No” group were significantly different than the “Not sure” group. For the Value
domain, the post hoc statistic showed that none of the groups were significantly (p<.05)
different from each other. The final post hoc analysis revealed that on the Behavior
domain, participants in the “Yes” group scored significantly (p<.001) different than
participants in the “No” group. Again, the “Not Sure” group was alternatively shown not
to score differently than the “Yes” or the “No” group.
Summary
This chapter described the development of an empirical model through
exploratory factor analysis. It also delineated the model testing process using
confirmatory factor analysis. A modified empirical model was shown to have a superior
model fit. This identified model was found to hold many theoretical similarities to the
original conceptual model. An analysis of validity revealed that the full Corporate Safety
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Culture Scale and the two identified domains maintained a relationship to safety
behaviors.
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CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION
This project was designed to develop a measure of corporate safety culture for the
transportation industry that inclusively addressed each domain of corporate culture. This
chapter provides a summary of the project’s development and results, and presents the
theoretical implications of the findings. The limitations of the study and
recommendations for future research are also discussed.
General Summary
Corporate culture is consistently shown to impact organizational growth,
performance, and safety (Miron, Erez, & Naheh, 2004; Prather, & Turrell, 2002;
Ogbonna & Harris, 2000; Deshpande, Farley, & Webster, 1993). However, corporate
leaders may have difficulty evaluating and influencing the culture of companies because
the construct has been poorly defined in the literature. Without solid and consistent
theoretical underpinnings, current tests of corporate of corporate culture are not easily
understood (Hopfl, 1994). The objective of this project was to develop a comprehensive
tool that accounted for the most common definitions of culture. In particular, the created
measure was designed to address: (1) Meaning systems, (2) Values, and (3) Behavioral
expectations.
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To complete this project, the investigator worked with the Colorado Department
of Transportation (CDOT). Because 40% of workplace accidents occur during periods of
transportation, CDOT places great emphasis on safety. Leaders in the organization
reported that they were invested in improving CDOT’s culture as it related to safety
because they believe positive changes in safety culture lead to increased safety practices.
With this aspiration in mind, the transportation company partnered with the investigator
to modify its annual safety survey. The investigator identified twenty-four items, both
developed by the researcher and adopted from the original CDOT survey, that
conceptually fit the hypothesized domains of culture. After these items were paired down
through expert review, and factor analysis, eleven items were defined as part of the
Corporate Safety Culture Scale (CSCS).
In the development of the Corporate Safety Culture Scale the investigator had two
major goals; first, to identify the factor structure that fit the data best, and second, to
evaluate the validity of the final measure. The findings associated with each of these
goals are discussed in the sections below.
Factor Structure
Prior to statistical analysis, the original twenty-four items were submitted to
expert review. Through this appraisal, five items were removed from the original scale.
To identify the factor structure of the CSCS, the data was first submitted to an
exploratory factor analysis. During the requisite test of assumptions, the investigator
determined that sample size was sufficient. Also, factorability of the correlation matrix
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was demonstrated, sphericity was significant, and linearity was assumed. When testing
the outlier assumption using the Mahalanobis distance, seventy cases were identified as
multivariate outliers. Because the investigator was unable to identify any theoretical
reason for the outliers, all seventy cases were removed.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
After testing, and correcting for the assumptions, the data was randomly spit into
two files. The first file (A) was used to complete the exploratory factor analysis, which
allowed for the identification of an empirical model. Principle components analysis was
used to explore the data because it allows for the greatest amount of data variance with
the fewest number of factors. After eliminating items that were shown to load on
multiple components, two factors were identified. When submitting the factors to an
Oblimin rotation, a between factors correlation of .25 was shown. In an effort to retain
only items with robust factor loadings, eleven of the twelve items were extracted. A
review of the remaining factor loadings showed two item groupings. Items grouped on
the first factor pertained to behavioral expectations. Items grouped on the second factor
pertained to employee values. Accordingly, the empirical model was identified as a twofactor structure, with the following domains: 1) Behaviors, 2) Values.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
To assess the model fit of the empirical factor structure, the second data file (B)
was submitted to a confirmatory factor analysis. Again, the required tests of assumptions
were completed. It was discovered that the assumption of normality was violated. The
investigator attempted to use skewness statistics to inform variable transformation, but all
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investigated transformations did not improve normality within the variables. As a result,
the original data was retained. The reliability of the empirical models was also assessed.
After removing one item from the behavior factor due to a low item-total correlation, the
reliability of the full scale was shown to be sufficient. Significant differences were
consistently shown between the groups. However, an evaluation of the eta’ squared
statistic showed that the effect size of these findings was very small. Although the
significant differences were shown between group, the power of these differences was
clearly limited.
Using CFA, the investigator compared the fit of the empirical model, and the
experimental model. The following fit indices were used to evaluate the fit of each
proposed model: χ2, RMSEA, CFI, and ECVI. The empirical model carried two factors:
Values and Behaviors (See Figure 4). Assessment of the empirical model revealed
inconsistent fit indices. Specifically, the chi-squared value was significant, and the
RMSEA suggested a poor model fit. The CFI statistic described an adequate model fit,
and the ECVI carried a score of .813.
The experimental model was tested in an effort to provide a theoretically
supported comparison to the empirical model. The original experimental structure held
the following three domains: Values, Meaning systems, and Behavioral expectations (See
Figure 5). When evaluated through CFA, the experimental structure was shown to fit the
data worse than the empirical model. Again, the chi-squared value was significant, and
the RMSEA identified an inadequate fit. The CFI statistic described an poor model fit,
and the ECVI carried a score of 1.76.
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Since neither the experimental or empirical model was shown to carry a strong fit,
a third model was assessed. The original empirical structure, which carried two domains
(Values, and Behaviors), barely missed sufficient fit. Consequently, the investigator
consulted the modification indices, and theory, to enhance model fit. The resulting model
was identified as the modified empirical model (See Figure 6). When evaluated, the
model was shown to have an adequate model fit. Each of the evaluated fit indices
pointed to a strong model fit, except the chi-squared value, which was overlooked due to
the large sample size. The ECVI value of .410 reveled a better fit than the experimental
model.
Validation
After identifying the model that best fit the data, the model’s validity was
assessed. Validity was evaluated using a one-way analysis of variance to test the
relationship between the full CSCS, along with its identified domains, and safety
behaviors. Safety behavior was measured by a single behavioral indicator item, listed
below.
Q61 I received a performance documentation form for using good safety practices during
the past 12 months.
Assumptions: Homogeneity
Tests of homogeneity showed that the assumption of homogeneity of variance
was achieved by the CSCS and the Value domain, but violated by the Behavior domain.
Accordingly the Welsh test was considered when contrasting groups.
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The participants were separated into three groups based on their answer to the
frequency item, (groups: (1) Yes, (2) No, and (3) Not Sure). The group member’s scores
on the full CSCS and each domain were compared. This evaluation showed that subjects
in the “Yes” group scored significantly higher, (P<.001) on the CSCS and the Behavior
domain than subjects in the “no” group. Similarly, subjects in the “Yes” group also
scored significantly higher (p<.05) on the Value domain than subjects in the “no” group.
Descriptive statistics revealed that the “Yes” group scored higher on the CSCS and each
of the identified domains than the “No” group and the “Not Sure” group. This finding
suggested that the CSCS is a valid measure of corporate safety culture.
The Tukey HSD Post hoc test was used to assess the differences between the
“Yes,” “No,” and “Not Sure” group on the full CSCS and the identified domains. The
statistic revealed that the difference between the “Yes” and “No” groups was significant
(p<.001) for the full scale and the Behavior domain. However, no significant difference
was shown for the Values domain. This finding showed that the scores on the behavioral
domain of the CSCS are related to scores on the behavioral frequency item, while scores
on the values domain are unrelated to values on the behavioral frequency item.
In summary, the results showed that the data is best explained by a modified
empirical factor structure. The identified model was shown to be reliable, with a limited
effect size. The full CSCS was validated.
Conclusions
Identified Model
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The present study sought to create a comprehensive and inclusive measure of
corporate culture, which assessed corporate safety culture across the following domains:
(1) Behavioral expectations, (2) Values, and (3) Meaning systems. However, this project
only partially fulfilled this objective. The factor analyses identified and supported a two
factor model, composed of a Behavior domain and a Values domain.
Extant Literature
A review of the corporate culture literature, shows a mass of research describing
themes associated with behavioral expectations, values, and meaning systems (Aceves &
King, 1978; Cunningham & Gresso, 1994; D’Andrade, 1996, Geertz 1973; Kessing &
Strathern, 1998; Murphy, 1986). Despite the common presence of these themes, the three
constructs are not known to be included in any single definition or measure of corporate
culture. As was previously explained, the assessment of all three constructs has been
thwarted because researchers have not been able to successfully include both meaning
and value-focused items within a single survey.
Researchers do not attempt the simultaneous measurement of meaning systems
and values because the concepts are conceptually very similar. The distinction between
the constructs is particularly difficult to create and explain in a measurement tool. As a
likely consequence, this author knows of no assessment of corporate culture that
deliberately assesses both meaning systems and values. Because both constructs are
present in the research, unique, and individually powerful, current instruments are limited
by this omission.
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On the other hand, the construct of behavior is contained in nearly every
definition of culture (Aceves & King, 1978; Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Cunningham &
Gresso, 1994; Ember & Ember, 2001; Haviland, 1993;Murphy, 1986; Whitten, & Hunter,
1987; Steadman, 1982). Because behavior is effortlessly observed, it is easy to assess.
As a likely result, employee behavior is often the focus of corporate culture and corporate
safety culture measures (Safety Performance Solutions, 2010; Thaden, & Gibbons, 2008).
While the focus on behavior is seen as an important component of culture
assessment, the extent of this focus is seen as excessive. As opposed to measuring the
effects of the underlying culture, many current measures only evaluate the specific
expectations of management. This myopic focus on behavior may reflect a
misunderstanding of the theoretical foundations of culture. For example, the Safety
Culture Indicator Scale Measurement System (SCISMS) is a well-known measure that
devotes approximately 80 percent of it’s questions to behavior-related topics. The
fixation on behavior misses the global construct of culture.
Findings
This project’s initial aspiration to define and measure culture as the sum of an
organization’s meaning systems, values, and behavioral expectations, was intended to
provide a more complete assessment of corporate safety culture. While the initial theory
maintains theoretical and intuitive appeal, it was not supported by the project’s findings.
The data produced can be interpreted in two ways: 1) The hypothesized model
was incorrect, and corporate safety culture is not best described as the sum of meaning
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systems, values, and beliefs. Or, 2) Corporate safety culture was not sufficiently
addressed by the items developed for present study.
1) Incorrect Model
The overwhelming data from the empirical analyses points to the superiority of
the two factor model, containing a Behavior and a Values domain. This conclusion fits
research suggesting that, at its core, safety culture consists of only behavior and values
(Cooper, 2000). If this premise is accepted, culture may be explained as values and their
behavioral indicators alone. More clearly, an organization’s safety culture might be
recognized simply as the values held by members of the organization, and reflected in the
member’s behavioral choices or perceptions. With this perspective, future investigations
of safety culture could focus entirely on values, and how those values are revealed
through behavior.
This concept may be interpreted further. If corporate culture can be recognized as
values held by employees and resulting behavioral decisions, then culture may be most
efficiently addressed through the measurement of behavior. If one assumes that behavior
is the result of values, it may be considered a strong indicator of the underlying culture.
With this interpretation, the item ratios contained in many of the measures
discussed in Table 2 makes conceptual sense. Behaviors are observable, easy to address,
and easy to measure. If they are the key to corporate safety culture, measures of culture
would effectively assess the construct through behavior-based questions. This
conceptualization fits the literature well. Several investigators have described culture as
“the way we do things around here” (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Harris, 2004).
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Although the argument could be made that culture is best assessed with
consideration only given to behavior, this author posits that it does not seem sensible to
take this approach. It is clear that behaviors can be influenced by many factors outside
the influence of underlying values. For example, when taking the CSCS, an employee
might respond positively to Q8, “Employee safety is not sacrificed for production during
a job.” While this answer provides information about safety behaviors, it does not
necessarily provide a reflection of the underlying culture. The positive answer may or
may not be a result of the employee’s values. Alternatively, it might reflect the
employee’s lack of motivation or interest in work.
In this case, the employee’s ambivalence about productivity could be the cause of
his/her response. If an investigator left the analysis at behavior, too much important
information is left to be assumed. With the addition of a Values domain, the investigator
is able to gain essential information about the underlying culture. For instance, if the
previously mentioned employee responded to values-focused Q46, “The most important
part of completing a job is being safe” A much clearer picture of culture would be
revealed.
2) Poor Items
As part of the item development phase, the investigator completed cognitive
interviews with the CDOT safety committee. In this meeting, the investigator presented
approximately thirty unique items to the safety committee. The committee paired down
the accepted items to thirteen. While this process increased the validity, readability, and
applicability of the created items, it also limited the investigator’s control of item
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creation. Because the safety committee was invested in limiting the number of additional
items, they voted against numerous theoretically supported items. In the investigator’s
estimation, the safety committee was unable to understand the theoretical underpinnings
of prospective items, and incorrectly assumed the same constructs could be measured by
items that were already included in the original CDOT survey items.
It is possible that the restrictions on item development and selection influenced
the investigator’s ability to address the distinct qualities of meaning systems, values, and
behavioral expectations. As a result, the similarities between values, and meaning
systems lead to the grouping of these items into a single factor. If this is the case, the
identification of the two factor model is explained by the poor item selection, and the
investigator’s original theory may be valid.
Specifically, culture may be evaluated as the sum of an organization’s meaning
systems, value’s behavioral expectations. With this interpretation, the implication for
further research is clear. More care must be given to the development of items designed
to measure the distinct constructs of meaning systems and values. For example, items
that explicitly address the relationship between safety and meaning. For example:
1) I believe that being a safe worker is meaningful,
2) Meaningful work is always safe,
3) Being a safe worker is part of my mission in life.
Each of these items specifically refers to meaning and appears to have greater face
validity than the items selected in the by the CDOT committee.

92	
  
	
  

Limitations
Demographics
A major limitation of the item development phase was the lack of demographic
questions. Although the investigator suggested that the CDOT Safety Committee include
a more robust demographic section, the committee argued that demographic questions
were unnecessary. They also noted that including demographic questions could
potentially make CDOT vulnerable to litigation in the future. The absence of a full
demographic section clearly limited that investigator’s ability to assess the impact of
individual characteristics on responses to the CSCS.
Further, the dearth of demographic information was shown to be particularly
disadvantageous during the assessment of outliers. The investigator felt obligated to
remove seventy cases that were determined to be outliers because no theoretical
explanation could be discovered. If demographic information had been gathered as part
of the survey, the multivariate outliers may have been explained and the removed cases
may have been retained.
One of the most necessary, but absent, demographic items concerned the
participant’s specific tenure with CDOT. The project was designed to evaluate the safety
culture of CDOT. In an effort to observe impact of a the organization’s culture, as
opposed to the aspersions of management, the decision was made to survey low-level
participants working in high risk departments. To measure the true impact of the culture,
it also would have been helpful to survey participants that had been working with CDOT
for several years. Without a question evaluating the participants’ specific tenure with
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CDOT, the responses of newly hired participants were indistinguishable from responses
produced by long-term employees.
Because corporate culture may be influenced be a wide range of personal
characteristics, it will be important for future researchers to create a comprehensive
demographic survey. Participant tenure is one of many personal variables that might
impact an individuals’ perception of corporate culture. For example, education,
ethnicity, age, previous experience, salary, and experience with work place accidents
might all influence a person’s recognition of an organization’s safety culture.
Outliers
As was previously mentioned, the assumption of outliers was violated. As a
result, seventy cases with Mahalanobis distance scores greater than 43.82 were removed.
This was a controversial decision. From a pure statistical position, the choice makes
sense. The outliers were unexplained and skewed the data. Eliminating the cases
allowed for a more valid analysis. However, others might argue the outliers were a
legitimate aspect of the sample. It could be said that removing the outliers, without any
theoretical reason, led to an inaccurate evaluation.
Skewness & Kurtosis
An additional limitation was revealed when the assumption of normality was
violated. The investigator attempted to transform variables in an effort to normalize the
distribution. However, none of the tested transformations (square root, inverse, reflect,
and logarithmic) increased normality. Because analysis of variance is thought to be
robust to violations of the normality assumption, the original variables were left
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unchanged. Given the unpredictable nature of accidents, the non-normality of the data
made sense. That said, the non-normality of the data suggests that the results of the
statistical analysis could be biased or misleading.

Expert Review
Another limitation of this study can be found in the investigator’s efforts to ensure
the validity of the items. In the test construction phase, the survey was submitted to 23
graduate students, who worked to assess the extent to which the proposed items
addressed the intended culture domains. While this process was designed to increase the
validity of the questions, it may have prevented the selection of optimal items. Some
might suggest that graduate students are likely to have a different perspective and
understanding of the hypothesized domains than the expect participants. Because the
population that evaluated the survey was very different than the population that took the
survey, item evaluation may have been inaccurate. If transportation employees had
assessed the items, it is possible that a different group of questions would have been
identified in the initial survey.
Validity
A one-way analysis of variance was used to evaluate the relationship between
scores on the CSCS, and a single safety behavior indicator item. In chapter two of this
project, the decision to complete this analysis using a single item to measure safety
behavior was discussed and supported. However, one might argue that a single item is
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insufficient to measure safety behavior. Critics could suggest that safety is more
appropriately measured through previously validated safety measures. This methodology
would have been superior as it would have allowed for the use of a regression. In this
case, predictive validity would have been assessed. With the methodology used in the
present project, the investigator could only compare groups.
The use of a single behavioral frequency items also brought into question the
importance of the full CSCS. Through the post hoc analysis, the behavior domain was
shown to relate significantly to scores on the behavioral frequency item. However, the
values domain was not shown to have a significant relationship with behavior. This
result showed that the CSCS was statistically significant because the behavior domain
was robust.
With this result, some might argue that the value domain should be removed from
the CSCS. This interpretation is rejected by the investigator. The non-significance of the
values domain points to the domain’s inability to relate to behavior. However it is
important to remember that the CSCS is designed to assess safety culture. The research
clearly shows that values are connected to culture. To remove the values domain would
greatly diminish the importance of the CSCS.
Also, as has been mentioned, the single behavioral frequency item limited the
breadth of assessment. It is possible that the value domain would relate significantly with
other behavioral frequency items. For example, given the conceptual nature of values,
the value domain might relate more significantly with behavioral frequency items that
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involve choice. The selected item reflects an appraisal given by an individual’s superior.
The item does not address a choice to behave in a safe manner.
Effect size
The analysis of variance showed that employees who received a performance
documentation form as a result of positive safety behavior scored significantly higher on
the CSCS, and the identified domains. The significant relationship between safety
behavior and scores on the CSCS is very important. Statistical significance demonstrates
that a given relationship not likely due to chance. However, significance does not mean
the finding is substantive. The eta squared statistic showed that the difference between
scores produced by participants in the “Yes,” “No,” and “Not Sure” groups was minor.
This finding is critical as it reflects the usefulness of the CSCS, and it’s domains. When
considering traditional eta squared expectations, (Cohen, 1988), the CSCS is not seen to
be substantive. It is believed that corporate safety culture has a robust relationship with
safety behavior. However, a strong relationship was not revealed by the statistical
analysis. This finding pulls the value of the CSCS into question. However it is important
that the reader does not interpret this finding as a reflection on the value of corporate
safety culture. The extant literature a convincingly argues that corporate safety culture
has a strong relationship with safety behavior (Erikson, 1997).
Contamination/Anonymity
The CSCS was developed by attaching conceptually supported items to an annual
safety survey distributed by CDOT. This approach to test development was simple and
efficient. In enabled wide distribution to a range of transportation employees working in
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high risk jobs. However, administering the items along with an annual safety survey may
have reduced the reliability of the data. The survey was administered by an organization
that was clearly invested in improving safety. As a result, participating employees may
have been concern that negative/unsafe responses would harm their reputation at work.
CDOT attempted to eliminate this contamination effect by keeping the surveys
anonymous. However it is possible that employees were unable to trust the promise of
confidentiality, and therefore answered the items with fear of penalty.
Unique Qualities of CSCS
Length
The short, straight forward arrangement of the CSCS is an asset because it will
produce lower dropout rates and limit answer fatigue (Cape, 2010). Also, from a
practical stand point, the CSCS may be advantageous in a organizational setting. As
organizations pursue productivity goals, efficiency is paramount. With eleven questions,
the CSCS will make an assessment of culture less demanding, and more feasible.
While surveys with fewer items have clear advantages, they do carry an inherent
limitation in scope. It is very difficult to measure multiple constructs without increasing
survey size. The CSCS is a valid measure of corporate safety culture, but it does not
assess any additional constructs. This is a limitation of the scale when compared to other
measures of corporate culture, which evaluate a range of corporate characteristics outside
the realm of culture.
Theory
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Regardless of explanation, the conclusions the present project showed that a two
factor model best fits the data. When accepted, this model suggests that safety culture
can be described simply as a single unitary value. Safety culture is the sum of values
held by employees as they pertain to safety. Behaviors likely represent indicators of
underlying employee values.
This finding was unexpected, but theoretically supported by the investigator’s
original theory and hypothesized model. Specifically, the investigator posited that
corporate safety culture can be measured as the sum of an organization’s universally
accepted meaning systems, values, and behavioral expectations as they relate to safety.
Factor analysis, did not support the presence of a meaning systems domain, but the
inclusion of values and behavior was supported.
Parsimony
The measurement of values and behavior is not unique to the CSCS. In fact,
nearly every measure of corporate safety culture includes an assessment of values, and
behaviors (Denison, 2010; Diaz-Cabrera, Hernandez-Fernaud, & Esla-Diaz, 2007; Safety
Performance Solutions, 2010; Thaden & Gibbons, 2008). However, the CSCS is unique
because it explicitly and parsimoniously addresses the two constructs. The other
evaluated measures assess the domains through the evaluation of disparate organizational
characteristics that relate to values and behaviors. To view a list of previously developed
measures, please see Table 2 on page 43.
The most apparent asset of the CSCS is it’s simplicity. As an eleven item scale,
containing two domains, the CSCS comes in stark contrast to other measures of corporate
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safety culture. The measures of corporate safety culture evaluated for this project were
much longer and more complicated. For example, the well-known Denison
Organizational Culture Survey contains sixty items, and addresses four domains
(Denison, 2010).
Several authors have argued for the importance of parsimony (Gauch, 2003).
While the three factor model holds conceptual support, The laws of parsimony, as they
relate to theory construction suggest that the most simple and elegant solution should be
accepted. See Figure 3 for a diagram of the accepted model identified through factor
analysis.
Figure 3

Accepted Model of Corporate Culture

Behaviors	
  

Culture	
  

Values	
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Further Research
This project was important because it endeavored to identify a solid definition and
measure of corporate culture. However, the investigator’s three factor experimental
model was not identified in the factor analysis. Instead, the analysis revealed a solid two
factor model. Through this chapter, the investigator has speculated about potential causes
for the rejection of the experimental model. However, to truly understand the model
identification, and corporate safety culture, further research will be necessary. It is
important that this project represents the initiation of new approach to the study of
corporate culture.
Ideally, a future project will present the CSCS, along with an updated grouping of
conceptually developed items to several large public and private transportation
organizations. If the items consistently reveal the two factor structure carried by the
current version of the CSCS, the investigator will be able to definitively support the
measure of values and behaviors in the assessment of safety culture. To truly evaluate the
validity and importance of any future interactions of the CSCS, the researchers will need
to analyze the relationship between the scale and safety behavior outcomes.
Summary
This chapter discussed the present project at length. A summary of the purpose,
methodology, and conclusions of the research were presented. Special attention was
drawn to the limitations of the study. In particular, item development restrictions,
skewed data, poor demographic analysis, validity, and effect size were discussed. The
101	
  
	
  

chapter included an explanation of the investigator’s final thoughts and recommendations
for further research. The final section described the implications of the Corporate Safety
Culture Scale.
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Figure 4

Empirical Model
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Figure 5

Experimental Model
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Figure 6

Modified Empirical Model
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Figure 7

A Comparison of Means:
Scores on CSCS and Safety Behavior
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Figure 8

A Comparison of Means:
Scores on Behavior Domain and Safety Behavior
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Figure 9

A Comparison of Means:
Scores on Values Domain and Safety Behavior
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Appendix A
Hi Paul,
I hope all is well with you. I am sorry I have not contacted you in the last months. After
our earlier meeting our research team took on a grant proposal that sapped all of our time.
I wanted to get back to you regarding our discussion of corporate culture, and the role of
family systems. Pat, Rob, and I were all very interested in your thoughts. It will
definitely be a topic that we consider working with in the future. Unfortunately, we are
each busy with individual projects that are temporarily taking time.
I am presently designing a measure of corporate culture for my dissertation, which I will
propose at the end of September. I have created an item pool of approximately 40 items
designed to evaluate 3 global categories of corporate culture. (observable characteristics,
motivating factors, & implicit values). I believe the current measurement tools are
limited because they only evaluate observable characteristics, (climate) Hopefully, my
tool will offer a more comprehensive picture of safety culture.
As I developed the items for my measure, I frequently referred to the culture tool you
used at CDOT. With your permission, I would like to incorporate some of your items
into my measure. I believe you did an excellent job including a wide breath of factors.
Earlier in the summer, we briefly spoke about using CDOT employees as a sample for
upcoming projects. If this is still an option, I would greatly appreciate the opportunity. In
return, I will provide you with data on your previously administered items, and feedback
from the results of my project.
I understand that you are very busy, so I really appreciate the attention you have provided
us at DU. You have already been extremely helpful. Thank you for your time and
consideration.
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Appendix B
Instructions:
Using the definitions, table and rating scale provided, rate the extent to which each
item fits within the proposed culture domain. Also, rate the items’ wording, and
offer suggestions for poorly written or unfocused items.
Domain Definitions
Meaning Systems:
Meaning Systems are underlying mental constructions that allow for the interpretation
and understanding of how daily events fall into an individual’s personal narrative.
Values:
Values represent the fundamental moral expectations that an individual uses to appraise
daily events.
Behavioral Expectations:
Behavioral Expectations refers to the activities that are anticipated within the course of an
individual’s employment responsibilities
Rating Scale
Strong Fit

1

2

3

4

5

Weak Fit

Rating Table
Items

Proposed Culture
Domain

I know how to spot safety
hazards

Meaning Systems

I know how to avoid safety
hazards

Meaning Systems

I know how to fix safety
hazards

Meaning Systems

I pride myself on my ability to
work safely

Meaning Systems

I hope to be known as a safe

Meaning Systems
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Domain Fit Score

worker
I avoid accidents by using
safety practices

Meaning Systems

I can prevent and avoid
accidents through my personal
actions

Meaning Systems

I attempt to correct safety
hazards at all times

Meaning Systems

My coworkers see me as a safe
worker

Meaning Systems

CDOT can only be successful if
it has a strong safety record

Values

Safety is more important than
productivity

Values

Safety at work is as important as Values
safety at home
The most important part of
completing a job is being safe

Values

I would rather be a safe
employee than a productive
employee

Values

Safe employees should be
rewarded

Values

The best employees are usually
the safest employees

Values

Employees feel free to report
safety hazards

Behavioral Expectations

My coworkers are committed to
the safety of others

Behavioral Expectations

Employee safety is not

Behavioral Expectations
122	
  

	
  

sacrificed for
production/quantity during a job
Employees are encouraged to
fix safety hazards

Behavioral Expectations

Employee safety is not
sacrificed for speed during a job

Behavioral Expectations

My coworkers look out for my
safety

Behavioral Expectations

Employee safety is not
sacrificed for quality during a
job

Behavioral Expectations

CDOT personnel usually follow
safety guidelines

Behavioral Expectations

I am encouraged to raise safety
concerns

Behavioral Expectations
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Appendix C

Colorado	
  Department	
  of	
  Transportation	
  

Employee	
  Safety	
  Survey	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

What	
  Do	
  You	
  Think	
  about	
  Employee	
  Safety	
  at	
  
	
  
	
  

A.	
   Overall	
  Safety	
  Climate	
  	
  	
  

Scale	
  Reliability:	
  	
  .83	
  	
  .85	
  

1.	
  

Overall,	
  CDOT	
  is	
  a	
  safe	
  place	
  to	
  work	
  

13.	
  

CDOT	
  is	
  committed	
  to	
  safety	
  

25.	
  

CDOT	
  values	
  safety	
  

	
  

B.	
   Management	
  Support	
  

Scale	
  Reliability:	
  	
  .87	
  	
  .91	
  

2.	
  

Senior	
  management	
  (division	
  directors,	
  RTD’s)	
  is	
  committed	
  to	
  safety	
  

14.	
  

Senior	
  management	
  (division	
  directors,	
  RTD’s)	
  helps	
  make	
  CDOT	
  a	
  safer	
  place	
  

26.	
  

Middle	
  management	
  (section/branch	
  heads)	
  is	
  committed	
  to	
  safety	
  

37.	
  

Middle	
  management	
  (section/branch	
  heads)	
  helps	
  make	
  CDOT	
  a	
  safer	
  place	
  

	
  

C.	
  

Supervisor	
  Support	
  

Scale	
  Reliability:	
  	
  .91	
  	
  .94	
  

5.	
  

My	
  supervisor	
  invests	
  time	
  to	
  keep	
  work	
  safe	
  

17.	
  

My	
  supervisor	
  invests	
  time	
  to	
  improve	
  safety	
  

29.	
  

My	
  supervisor	
  helps	
  make	
  CDOT	
  a	
  safer	
  place	
  

	
  

D.	
   Coworker	
  Support	
  

Scale	
  Reliability:	
  	
  .88	
  	
  .90	
  

10.	
  

My	
  coworkers	
  are	
  committed	
  to	
  the	
  safety	
  of	
  others	
  

22.	
  

My	
  coworkers	
  look	
  out	
  for	
  my	
  safety	
  

34.	
  

My	
  coworkers	
  help	
  make	
  CDOT	
  a	
  safer	
  place	
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E.	
  

Employee	
  Support	
  

Scale	
  Reliability:	
  	
  .71	
  	
  .75	
  

3.	
  

Employees	
  take	
  all	
  safety	
  precautions	
  before	
  doing	
  a	
  job	
  

15.	
  

Employees	
  wear	
  appropriate	
  personal	
  protective	
  equipment	
  

27.	
  

Employees	
  do	
  not	
  take	
  unnecessary	
  safety	
  risks	
  at	
  work	
  

38.	
  

Employees	
  wear	
  seat	
  belts	
  when	
  riding	
  in	
  state	
  vehicles	
  

	
  

F.	
  

Employee	
  Involvement	
  

Scale	
  Reliability:	
  	
  .83	
  	
  .83	
  

6.	
  

Employees	
  feel	
  free	
  to	
  report	
  safety	
  hazards	
  

18.	
  

Employees	
  are	
  encouraged	
  to	
  fix	
  safety	
  hazards	
  

30.	
  

I	
  am	
  encouraged	
  to	
  raise	
  safety	
  concerns	
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Appendix D
	
  
Corporate Safety Culture Scale
Q6 Employees feel free to report safety hazards
Q8 Employee safety is not sacrificed for production during a job
Q18 Employees are encouraged to fix safety hazards
Q20 Employee safety is not sacrificed for speed during a job
Q30 I am encouraged to raise safety concerns
Q32 Employee safety is not sacrificed for quality during a job
Q40 I pride myself on my ability to work safely
Q41 Safety is more important than productivity
Q42 I hope to be known as a safe worker
Q44 Safety at work is as important as safety at home
Q46 The most important part of completing a job is being safe
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